ARE CHINESE COURTS PRO-LABOR OR PRO-EMPLOYER?
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ABSTRACT
As a socialist nation with laws promoted as “pro-labor,” the
official representation is that China’s legal system (in particular its
courts) gives special protection to employees. China’s labor statutes
(in particular, the Labor Contract Law) favor employees. The debate
on whether Chinese courts are “pro-labor” or “pro-employer” has
been going on for many years. The established perception is that
Chinese courts are “pro-labor.” By examining 2,054 sampled
dismissal cases for serious breaches of employers’ internal
regulations, this article shows that Chinese courts are in no way
“pro-labor.” The employers have won by a substantial margin.
Courts in most cases only conducted a simple factual review to see
if the employer’s internal regulations have been violated by the
employee. Courts in most cases did not conduct a substantive
assessment of whether the dismissal was fair or unfair (“fairness
review”). The data reveals that the fairness review is pivotal in the
determination of litigation outcome. Had the court conducted a
fairness review in every case, the employees would have prevailed.
The failure of the court to conduct a fairness review is solid proof
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that courts favor employers.
This ground-breaking finding
contradicts the established perception that courts are “pro-labor”
and past empirical literature that suggests employees are winning
in labor disputes lawsuits. This study shows that despite the “prolabor” perception, the Chinese courts are, in fact, “pro-employer.”
This revelation has profound implication for the study of judicial
protection of labor rights in socialist authoritarian regimes.
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INTRODUCTION

As a socialist nation, the official representation is that China’s
labor statutes are pro-labor. 1 The Labor Contract Law of the
People’s Republic of China (“LCL”), a predominant labor statute in
China,2 was first promulgated in 2008, and subsequently amended

1
Before the implementation of the Labor Contract Law (“LCL”), Baoshu Sun
(孙宝树), Vice Minister of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security, in responding
to questions from the media, said the LCL focuses on the protection of the legitimate
rights and interests of vulnerable workers, so as to achieve the balance of strength
and interests of both sides. Laodong He Shehui Baozhang Bu Fubuzhang Sun Baoshu
Jiu Laodong Hetong Fa Da Jizhe Wen (劳动和社会保障部副部长孙宝树就《劳动合同
法》答记者问) [Sun Baoshu, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Labor and Social Security,
answered reporters’ questions on the “Labor Contract Law”], PKULAW (June 29, 2007),
https://www.pkulaw.com/lawexplanation/8cd1bc039c6bc20518cc102c3fca2769b
dfb.html [https://perma.cc/D9CJ-F658] [hereinafter Sun Baoshu]; see also Xi
Xiaoming (奚晓明), Zhongguo Tese Shehuizhuyi Falü Tixi Xingcheng Yihou de Minshi
Shenpan Gongzuo (中国特色社会主义法律体系形成以后的民事审判工作 ) [Civil Trial
Work after the Formation of the Socialist System of Laws with Chinese Characteristics], 69
ZHONGGUO SHENPAN (中国审判) [CHINA TRIAL] 8, 10 (2011) (noting that the LCL has
been promulgated under the socialist legal system); Zhang Huiqin (章惠琴) & Guo
Wenlong (郭文龙), Cong Qingxie Baohu Yuanze Shenshi Laodong Hetong Fa Zhi Xiugai
(从倾斜保护原则审视《劳动合同法》之修改 ) [Reviewing the Amendment of the Labor
Contract Law from the Principle of Tilted Protection], XUESHUJIE (学术界) [ACADEMICS],
no. 1, 2017, at 42, 43-44 (noting that the LCL is designed to protect the rights and
interests of the workers). But see Patricia Chen & Mary Gallagher, Mobilization
Without Movement: How the Chinese State “Fixed” Labor Insurgency, 71 ILR REV. 1029,
1029 (2018) (explaining why a “broad-based labor movement” failed to take shape
in China despite having “pro-labor legislation” and “movement-oriented labor
NGOs”).
2
Apart from the Labor Contract Law, there are two other key labor related
national legislations in China. Laodong Fa (劳动法) [Labor Law] (promulgated by
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., July 5, 1994, amended Dec. 29, 2018,
effective Dec. 29, 2018) 2019 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 155
(China); Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa ( 劳 动 争 议 调 解 仲裁 法 ) [Labor
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2007, effective May 1, 2008),
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2007-12/29/content_2602214.htm
[https://perma.cc/V79B-NS66] (China). The Labor Law provides a high-level
regulatory framework for employment relations, while the Labor Dispute
Mediation and Arbitration Law sets out the dispute resolution mechanism for labor
disputes. It is the Labor Contract Law, however, that provides for the detailed
regulation of employment contracts and labor-employer relations. This Article
focuses on the enforcement of the Labor Contract Law.
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in 2012.3 While some have questioned its actual effectiveness,4 LCL
has generally been hailed by many as a milestone in labor rights
protection,5 including for migrant workers.6 LCL made it clear that
special protection is given to labor rights.7 Major changes have been
introduced by LCL. For instance, LCL established the requirement
that an employer must enter into a written labor contract with the
employee upon commencement of any full-time employment, 8
3
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law] (promulgated by the
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, amended Dec. 28, 2012,
effective July 1, 2013), 2013 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 45 (China).
4
See Shuming Zhao & Jie Zhang, Impact of Employment Contracts Law on
Employment Relations in China, 45 INDIAN J. INDUS. RELS. 566, 567-79 (2010)
(discussing the adverse impacts of the LCL); see also Zhiming Cheng, Russell Smyth
& Fei Guo, The Impact of China’s New Labour Contract Law on Socioeconomic Outcomes
for Migrant and Urban Workers, 68 HUM. RELS. 329, 348 (2015) (noting critiques of the
LCL); Muriel Périsse, Labour Law in China: How Does It Contributes to the Economic
Security of the Workforce? A Commonsian Reading, 51 J. ECON. ISSUES 1, 15-23 (2017)
(discussing unintended effects of the LCL); Randall Akee, Liqiu Zhao & Zhong Zao,
Unintended Consequences of China’s New Labour Contract Law on Unemployment and
Welfare Loss of Workers, 53 CHINA ECON. REV. 87, 103-04 (2019) (finding that the LCL
may have caused companies to dismiss workers).
5
See Sean Cooney, China’s Labour Law, Compliance and Flaws in Implementing
Institutions, 49 J. INDUS. RELS. 673, 683-84 (2007) (noting that the LCL addressed
previously noted legal deficiencies in the existing labor law); see also Haiyan Wang,
Richard P. Applebaum, Francesca Degiuli & Nelson Lichtenstein, China’s New
Labour Contract Law: Is China Moving Towards Increased Power for Workers?, 30 THIRD
WORLD Q. 485, 489-94 (2009) (discussing the positive impact of the LCL).
6
See generally Xiaoying Li & Richard B. Freeman, How Does China’s New Labour
Contract Law Affect Floating Workers?, 53 BRIT. J. INDUS. RELS. 711 (2015) (discussing
evidence that the LCL improved working conditions for migrant workers).
7 See, e.g., Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 1 (“This
Law is formulated for the purposes of improving the labor contractual system,
clarifying the rights and obligations of both parties of labor contracts, protecting the
legitimate rights and interests of employees, and establishing and developing a
harmonious and stable employment relationship.”); see also id. art. 14 (stating that
among other things, “[i]f the employer fails to sign a written labor contract with an
employee after the lapse of one full year from the date when the employee begins
to work, it shall be deemed that the employer and the employee have concluded a
labor contract without a fixed term.”).
If remunerations, work conditions, and other criteria are not expressly
stipulated in a labor contract and a dispute is triggered, the employer and
the employee may re-negotiate the contract. If no agreement is reached
through negotiations, the provisions of the collective contract shall be
followed. If there is no collective contract or if there is no such stipulation
about the remuneration, the principle of equal pay for equal work shall be
observed. If there is no collective contract or if there is no such stipulation
about the work conditions and other criteria in the collective contract, the
relevant provisions of the state shall be followed.
Id. art. 18.
8
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 10.
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which was not a requirement prior to the LCL. The LCL also
provided the content requirement for every labor contract (e.g., the
contract must provide for working hours and holidays). 9
Remuneration provided in a labor contract must not be lower than
the minimum wage. 10 Targeting widespread practices of late
payment or non-payment of wages, the LCL expressly required that
wages must be paid in full on time.11
The LCL is widely regarded as a pro-labor statute.12 It is also the
legislative intention of the LCL to give special protection to labor
Id. art. 17.
Id. art. 85.
11
Id. art. 30.
12
Existing literature suggests that the LCL offers “tilted protection” to
employees. The LCL recognizes that the employees are in a weaker position in the
employment relations and the need to particularly favor the employees. See Zhang
& Guo, supra note 1, at 43-44; Wang Bei (王蓓), Cheng Long (程龙) & Lü Guofan
(吕国凡), Laodong Zhengyi Susong de Shizheng Kaocha Yu Duice Yanjiu—Yi Gongping
Yu Xiaolü de Guanxi Wei Shijiao (劳动争议诉讼的实证考察与对策研究 —以公平与效
率 的 关 系 为 视 角 ) [An Empirical Examination of Labor Dispute Litigation and
Countermeasures—The Relationship Between Fairness and Efficiency as a Perspective],
SICHUAN DAXUE XUEBAO ZHEXUE SHEHUIKEXUE BAN (四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版
)) [J. SICHUAN U. (SOC. SCI. ED.)], no. 5, 2012, at 118, 118; Kinglun Ngok, The Changes
of Chinese Labor Policy and Labor Legislation in the Context of Market Transition, 73 INT’L.
LAB. & WORKING-CLASS HIST. 45, 59-61 (2008); Haina Lu, New Developments in China’s
Labor Dispute Resolution System: Better Protection for Workers’ Rights?, 29 COMPAR.
LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 247, 257, 271 (2008); Thomas F. Remington & Xiao Wen Cui, The
Impact of the 2008 Labor Contract Law on Labor Disputes in China, 15 J.E. ASIAN STUD.
271, 271-74 (2015); Dong Yan, Juridification in Chinese Labour Law: A Cautionary Tale
of Remuneration Disputes, 41 EMP. RELS. 1273, 1273 (2019); Bin Wu & Yongnian
Zheng, A Long March to Improve Labour Standards in China: Chinese Debates on the New
Labour Contract Law, BRIEFING SERIES, issue 39, Apr. 2008, at 1, 4; Zhao Yixuan (赵艺
璇), Laodong Fa Shang de Laodong Yiwu Jujue Jifuquan (劳动法上的劳动义务拒绝给付
权 ) [The Right to Refuse to Perform Labor Obligations Under Labor Law], 24 GUOJIA
JIANCHAGUAN XUEYUAN XUEBAO ( 国 家 检 察 官 学 院 学 报 ) [J. NAT’L PROSECUTORS
COLL.], 133, 136 (2016); Dong Wenjun (董文军), Laodong Hetong Jingji Buchang de
Zhidu Shanbian Yu Gongneng Jiexi ( 劳动合 同 经 济补偿 的制 度 嬗 变与 功 能解 析 )
[Analysis of the Institutional Transmutation and Function of Financial Compensation in
Labor Contracts], DANGDAI FAXUE (当代法学) [CONTEMP. L.], no. 6, 2011, at 99, 102;
Yuan Zhonghua ( 袁 中 华 ), Laodong Hetong Jiechu Zhengyi Zhi Zhengming Zeren
Fenpei—Jiyu Fajiaoyixue de Fenxi (劳动合同解除争议之证明责任分配—基于法教义学
的分析 ) [Allocation of Burden of Proof in Disputes over Dissolution of Employment
Contracts—An Analysis Based on Legal Doctrine], FASHANG YANJIU (法商研究) [STUD.
L. & BUS.], no. 1, 2019, at 130, 139 (discussing LCL’s preferential protection of
laborers when it comes to termination); Zhou Xianri (周贤日) & Peng Yaozong (彭
耀宗), Laodong Guanxi de Fal Ganyu Jizhi Yanjiu—Cong Guojia Shehui He Siren Zeren
Pingheng de Weidu (劳动关系的法律干预机制研究—从国家、社会和私人责任平衡的
维 度 ) [Research on the Legal Intervention Mechanism of Labor Relations—From the
Dimension of the Balance of State, Social and Private Responsibilities], FAZHI SHEHUI (法
9

10
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rights.13 Workers were consulted extensively during the legislative
process of the LCL. 14 In a way, the legislature was aware of the
power imbalance between employers and employees, and used the
LCL to level the playing field for employees.15 Commentators have
pointed out that the LCL provides “tilted protection” (倾斜保护) for
employees.16 In other words, the LCL recognizes that employees are
in a weaker position in employment relations, and there is a need to
particularly favor the employees as a result of this power
imbalance.17 For instance, the LCL provides that “[if] an employer
治社会) [FED. SOC’Y.], no. 4, 2017, at 6, 7 (discussing the LCL’s preferential protection
of laborers); Wu Wanqun (吴万群), Dui Laodong Fa Qingxiedu de Jidian Kaoliang (对
劳动法”倾斜度”的几点考量) [How Tilted is the Labor Law?: A Few Points to Consider],
FUYANG SHIFAN XUEYUAN XUEBAO SHEHUIKEXUE BAN (阜阳师范学院学报(社会科学版
)) [J. FUYANG NORMAL U. (SOC’L SCI. ED.)], no. 4, 2010, at 97, 98.
13
Sun Baoshu, supra note 1.
14
See Malcolm Warner & Ying Zhu, Labour and Management in the People’s
Republic of China: Seeking the 'Harmonious Society,' 16 ASIA PAC. BUS. REV. 285, 294
(2010) (discussing how the Standing Committee solicited feedback on a draft of the
Labor Contract Law and individual workers and union leaders participated in
arguments over the first official draft of the law). For further discussion of how the
government consulted workers in drafting the LCL, see also Wang, Applebaum,
Degiuli & Lichtenstein, supra note 5, at 490; Quanguo Renda Changweihui Jieshao
Laodong Hetongfa Caoan Zhengqiu Yijian Qingkuang (全国人大常委会介绍劳动合同法
草 案 征 求 意 见 情 况 ) [The Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress
Introduces the Draft of the Labor Contract Law and Solicits Opinions], ZHONGHUA
RENMIN GONGHEGUO ZHONGYANG RENMIN ZHENGFU (中华人民共和国中央人民政府)
[CENT. PEOPLE'S GOV’T CHINA] (Apr. 21, 2006), http://www.gov.cn/xwfb/200604/21/content_260252.htm [https://perma.cc/7QK7-D7WD] [hereinafter Standing
Committee Introduces the Draft].
15
Standing Committee Introduces the Draft, supra note 14. An authoritative
commentary on the LCL indicated that the LCL focuses on the protection of the
legitimate rights and interests of workers (as the weaker party), so as to achieve the
balance of strength and interests between the two sides, with a view to promoting
a harmonious and stable employment relationship. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo
Laodong Hetong Fa Qicao Xiaozu (中华人民共和国劳动合同法起草小组) [Drafting
Group of the Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of China], Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa Lijie Yu Shiyong (《中华人民共和国劳动
合同法》理解与适用) [Interpretation and Application of The Labor Contract Law of
the People's Republic of China] 2 (2013). Furthermore, the Supreme People’s Court
was well aware of the power imbalance between employers and employees, and
that there was nothing wrong for the law to be tilted towards the employees given
that they are the weaker party. See Xi, supra note 1.
16
Li Gen, The Legal Analysis of the Dilemma of Labor Relationship Development in
the Process of Social Transformation in China: From the Perspective of “Labor Blackmail,”
5 CHINA LEGAL SCI. 3, 12-13 (2017); see also Zhang & Guo, supra note 1, at 44-45
(discussing this phenomenon).
17
To supplement the quantitative study, the Author collected data from
thirty-four informants who are all judges. All thirty-four informants responded to
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fails to conclude a written labor contract with an employee after the
lapse of more than one month but less than one year as of the day
when it started using him, it shall pay to the worker his monthly
wages at double amount.”18 Another example is “[if] the employer
fails to sign a written labor contract with an employee after the lapse
of one full year from the date when the employee begins to work, it
shall be deemed that the employer and the employee have
concluded a labor contract without a fixed term.” 19 One further
example is that if the employer terminates the labor contract in
violation of the LCL, it must pay double compensation to the
employee.20 These provisions clearly favor the employee and has
the effect of reversing the power disparity between labor and
employers. There is a socio-political reason for the laws to favor
labor. Policymakers are well aware of the potential disruption to
social stability workers can cause if they are treated unfairly in labor
disputes.21 With the economy developing rapidly, workers are more
aware of their rights. It is in the political interest of the state to take
special care of workers’ interests and manage their grievances in a

a questionnaire on issues relating to labor disputes in general and Serious Breach
Dismissal Cases specifically. Eighty percent of the informants who responded to
the questionnaire created for this study believe that the LCL is pro-labor.
Informants who were interviewed in this study predominantly believe that the LCL
is pro-labor. See, e.g., Interview with No. 15 Informant ID: 2020.07.09.1 (Sept. 8,
2020); Interview with No. 32 Informant ID: 2020.07.20.9 (Sept. 12, 2020); Interview
with No. 34 Informant ID: 2020.08.11 (Sept. 10, 2020); Interview with No. 3
Informant ID: 2020.06.17.3 (Sept. 12, 2020); Interview with No. 9 Informant ID:
2020.06.17.9 (Sept. 11, 2020); Interview with No. 17 Informant ID: 2020.07.09.3 (Sept.
10, 2020); Interview with No. 16 Informant ID: 2020.07.09.2 (Sept. 12, 2020);
Interview with No. 6 Informant ID: 2020.06.17.6 (Sept. 30, 2020). All interviews are
on file with the Author.
18
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 82.
19
Id. art. 14.
20
Id. art. 87.
21 For instance, a Sichuan intermediate court, in a court publication, highlighted
the negative effects on courts caused by workers’ petitioning (xinfang) as a result of
the workers losing lawsuits. See Laodong Hetong Fa He Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa Shishi Hou
Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Shenli Zhong Ruogan Redian Nandian Wenti Tanxi (《劳动合
同法》和《调解仲裁法》实施后劳动争议案件审理中若干热点难点问题探析) [On
the Topical and Difficult Issues in the Trial of Labor Disputes After the Implementation of
the Labor Contract Law and Mediation and Arbitration Law], CHENGDU FAYUAN WANG
( 成 都 法 院 网 )
[CHINACOURT]
(Jan.
7,
2010,
22:45),
http://cdfy.chinacourt.gov.cn/article/detail/2009/01/id/565185.shtml
[https://perma.cc/W2UL-XXQD].
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more controlled manner. 22 This outlines the background of the
legislation of the LCL.23
While the text of the LCL clearly provides special protection to
labor, assessing the effectiveness of enforcement of the LCL is more
nuanced exercise. For instance, employee satisfaction with the
enforcement of the LCL varied with different factors, such as age,
educational level, geography, the capacity of the employer, and
existence of an employment contract.24 A study found that the LCL
had varying effects across “different types of firms depending on
their ownership structure, product mix, market orientation, size and
geographical location.” 25 The labor protection regime is also
influenced by the divergent local rules and practices in different
provinces in China. 26 Cultural factors also play a role in the
enforcement of labor laws.27 As for specific measures, some features
of the LCL are more effective than others in practice. A feature that
has proven to be effective is the use of collective agreements. 28
Under the LCL, for instance, where an employer fails to conclude a
written employment contract and the remuneration is unclear, the
remuneration of the employee should follow the provisions of the
collective agreement. 29 A commentator noted that “Chinese
22
See Mary E. Gallagher, China’s Workers Movement and the End of the RapidGrowth Era, 143 DAEDALUS 81, 83-84 (2014) (noting that Chinese workers are
increasingly aware of their rights and the dilemma of the Chinese government to
“improve governance and quality of life without losing control”).
23
See Wang, Applebaum, Degiuli & Lichtenstein, supra note 5, at 498
(commenting that “[by] providing favorable legal provisions for the most
oppressed workers, the new law actually encourages them to channel the fight for
their legal rights to their own employers—rather than merely rail against an ‘unfair
society’”).
24
Mary Gallagher, John Giles, Albert Park & Meiyan Wang, China’s 2008 Labor
Contract Law: Implementation and Implications for China’s Workers, 68 HUM. RELS. 197,
205 (2015).
25
Tu Lan, John Pickles & Shengjun Zhu, State Regulation, Economic Reform and
Worker Rights: The Contingent Effects of China’s Labour Contract Law, 45 J. CONTEMP.
ASIA 266, 266 (2015).
26
See Cheng Jinhua (程金华) & Ke Zhenxing (柯振兴), Zhongguo Falü Quanli
de Lianbangzhi Shijian: Yi Laodong Hetong Fa Lingyu Weili (中国法律权力的联邦制实
践—以劳动合同法领域为例) [The Practice of Federalism of Legal Power in China—An
Example in the Field of Labor Contract Law], FAXUEJIA (法学家) [THE JURIST], no. 1, 2008,
at 1, 1 (noting how local legislation and judicial practices are in conflict with central
legislation and judicial practices).
27
Wei Shen & Rohan Price, Confucianism, the Rise of Worker Activism and Labour
Law in China, 12 CHINA: INT’L J. 115, 118 (2014).
28
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], arts. 51-56.
29
Id. art. 11.
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collective agreements have so far had a ‘substitution effect’ that
might create additional leverage to protect workers’ rights and
interests, even in the absence of individual agreements or clauses.”30
However, the number of lawsuits involving collective agreements
remains low as compared to the total number of collective
agreements and other labor disputes.31 While collective agreements
have a positive effect in entrenching labor rights, the effectiveness of
collective consultation has been called into question.32 Under the
LCL,
the
labor
unions
should
establish
collective
consultation/negotiation mechanism with employers with the
objective to protect the rights and interests of employees.33 It has
been said that collective consultation is used by the Chinese
government to “[contain] the recent rise in labour unrest, while
pragmatically postponing collective bargaining for the sake of
stability and growth.” 34 The LCL has been generally effective in
protecting the rights of migrant workers. An empirical study
showed that the LCL “increased the percentage of migrant workers
with written contracts, which in turn raised social insurance
coverage, reduced the likelihood of wage arrears and raised the
likelihood that workers has a union at their workplace.”35 Another
study has found that the LCL is more effective in enhancing the
welfare of urban workers than migrant workers in areas of “receipt
of social benefits, subjective well-being and wages.”36 A study calls
for the LCL to improve on its clarity, showing an increase of
“factually complicated” remuneration disputes (e.g. overtime
claims) triggered by ambiguities in the LCL.37 The promotion of the
use of mediation as the preferred medium for labor dispute

30
Dong Yan, Unveiling the Legal Effect of Collective Agreements in China, 42 EMP.
RELS. 366, 377 (2020).
31
Id. at 366.
32
See Feng Chen & Xin Xu, “Active Judiciary”: Judicial Dismantling of Workers’
Collective Action in China, 67 CHINA J. 87, 105-06 (2012) (finding that Chinese courts
are able to side with the employee in individual labor disputes as the dispute are
non-politically sensitive, but are hostile towards labor collective actions given the
political sensitivity of such actions).
33
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 6.
34
Qingjun Wu & Zhaoyang Sun, Collective Consultation Under Quota
Management: China’s Government-Led Model of Labour Relations Regulation, 153 INT’L
LAB. REV. 609, 609 (2014).
35
Li & Freeman, supra note 6, at 711.
36
Zhiming Cheng, Russell Smyth & Fei Guo, supra note 4, at 329.
37
Yan, supra note 12.
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resolution by the state and local governments (as a policy tool)38 has
created concern that labor rights guaranteed under the statutes are
not fully enforced in practice.39
The enforcement of the LCL varies across regions. Despite
established national rules on labor dispute resolution, 40 and an
established labor dispute arbitration system (which is the first
instance forum for labor disputes),41 the divergence in local practices
in labor dispute resolution is alarmingly significant,42 partly due to
the fact that there are gaps and deficiencies in the national statutes
that govern labor disputes43 and partly due to a deliberate attempt
to decentralize labor relations.44 It is possible for local authorities to
enact rules and regulations with their own provided certain
requirements.45 While formally local rules and regulations must be
consistent with the national law, inconsistencies are not always
identified and rectified. Some argue that this creates a kind of quasifederalism in the enforcement of law given the wide variety of local
38
For the effect of the policy of preferring mediation on the management of
civil justice in China, see generally PETER C.H. CHAN, MEDIATION IN CONTEMPORARY
CHINESE CIVIL JUSTICE: A PROCEDURALIST DIACHRONIC PERSPECTIVE (2017).
39
See Wenjia Zhuang & Feng Chen, “Mediate First”: The Revival of Mediation in
Labour Dispute Resolution in China, 222 CHINA Q. 380, 382 (2015) (noting how
mediation leads to outcomes favorable to the authorities).
40
Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa ( 劳 动 争 议 调 解 仲 裁 法 ) [Labor
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law]; see Yun Zhao, China’s New Labor Dispute
Resolution Law: A Catalyst for the Establishment of Harmonious Labor Relationship?, 30
COMPAR. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 409, 416-26 (2009) (examining the new Labor Dispute
Resolution Law, its framework and features).
41
For criticism of the arbitration system, see Kyung-Jin Hwang & Kan Wang,
Labour Dispute Arbitration in China: Perspectives of the Arbitrators, 37 EMP. RELS. 582,
585-87 (2015).
42
See Wang Tianyu (王天玉), Laodong Fa Guizhi Linghuohua de Falü Jishu (劳动
法规制灵活化的法律技术) [Legal Techniques for Flexibility of Labor Law Regulations],
FAXUE (法学) [LEGAL SCI.], no. 10, 2017, at 76, 89 (suggesting amending the LCL to
allow local legislatures and administrative authorities to enact specific rules
customized for local practices).
43
The national law only requires the employer to notify the labor union before
dismissal. Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 43. There
is no requirement to consult with the labor union. Also, there is no requirement to
give employees an opportunity to be heard before dismissal.
44
See Eli Friedman & Sarosh Kuruvilla, Experimentation and Decentralization in
China’s Labor Relations, 68 HUM. RELS. 181, 182 (2015) (arguing that China is taking
an “experimental, gradualist, and decentralized approach to reform of the system
of labor relations”).
45
Lifa Fa (立法法) [Legislation Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, amended Mar. 15, 2015, effective Mar. 15, 2015),
art. 73, 2015 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 163 (China).
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rules and regulations. 46 For instance, Beijing, Shanghai and
Guangdong each have its own set of local rules to regulate
employment relations. 47 The complexity and divergences in
different local labor rules are further complicated by the inherent
bias that some claim that Chinese courts hold against migrant
workers.48 But local legislation sometimes enhances the protection
of labor rights. Suzhou is a prime example. The Suzhou City
Intermediate Court and Suzhou City Labor Disputes Arbitration
Committee devised a set of regulations governing dismissal for
serious breach of employer’s internal regulations (“Suzhou
Regulations”). Under the Suzhou Regulations, if the employer
failed to give the employee an opportunity to be heard before
dismissing the employee for breach of the employer’s internal
regulations, the dismissal must be considered unfair (and therefore,
unlawful).49 The Suzhou Regulations also imposes a requirement on
the employer to consult (not just notify) the labor union when an
employee is dismissed.50
While the LCL and other labor statutes51 are clearly drafted with
the intention to afford special protection to the employees, the
judicial interpretation of these instruments may not necessarily
result in pro-labor outcomes. In other words, while statutory law
See Cheng & Ke, supra note 26.
For example, for Beijing, see Guanyu Shenli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Falü
Shiyong Wenti De Jieda (北京高院关于审理劳动争议案件法律适用问题的解答)
[Answers of Beijing Higher People’s Court on the Application of Law in Hearing
Labor Dispute Cases] (promulgated by the Beijing Higher People’s Ct. & Beijing
Lab. Arb. Comm., Apr. 24, 2017, effective Apr. 24, 2017), (Westlaw China 万律
(Westlaw China)).
48
See Jize Jiang & Kai Kuang, Hukou Status and Sentencing in the Wake of Internal
Migration: The Penalty Effect of Being Rural-to-Urban Migrants in China, 40 L. & POL’Y.
196, 196 (2018) (finding “discrimination against rural-to-urban migrants” in the
quantitative examination of criminal cases in China).
49
Suzhoushi Zhongji Renmin Fayuan Suzhoushi Laodong Zhengyi Zhongcai
Weiyuanhui Laodong Zhengyi Yantaohui Jiyao (苏州市中级人民法院、苏州市劳动
争议仲裁委员会劳动争议研讨会纪要) [Summary of Seminar on Labor Dispute of
Suzhou Intermediate People’s Court and Suzhou Labor Dispute Arbitration
Committee], GONGSHANG PEICHANG FALÜ WANG (工伤赔偿法律网) [WORK INJURY
LEGAL
COMPENSATION
NETWORK]
(Sept.
8,
2014,
08:09
AM),
http://www.ft22.com/jiangsusheng/2014-9/5822.html [https://perma.cc/P8VUQY6A].
50
Art. 43 of the LCL only requires the employer to notify the labor union
before the dismissal and does not require consultation with the labor union.
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 43.
51
For the features that give specific protection to employees under the Labor
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, see Zhao, supra note 40, at 423-26.
46
47
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may strongly favor the weaker group, courts may not interpret the
law in such a way that would result in the protection of the weaker
group. The divergences in enforcement of the LCL as discussed
above is an indication that the black-letter law and judicial
enforcement of the law can be very different. Also, despite the
socialist rhetoric underlying the statutory and policy infrastructure
governing labor-employer relations, actual judicial practice may not
be as “socialist” as it is officially represented.52 This study seeks to
go beyond the black-letter law and empirically assess how courts
shape the employee protection regime in China. This is particularly
important from a socio-economic perspective as courts in China are
tasked with the policy mission of maintaining social stability. 53
While the LCL and other labor instruments are pro-labor (or at least
represented as pro-labor), are Chinese courts in fact pro-labor in
adjudicating labor disputes? This article seeks to answer this
question by reviewing 2,054 sampled cases relating to what are
known as “serious breach dismissals.” Under the LCL, the
employer is entitled to terminate the employment contract if the
employee had “seriously breached” the internal regulations of the
employer (“Serious Breach Dismissal Cases”). 54 Contrary to the
established perception that courts are pro-labor and existing studies
52
ELAINE SIO-IENG HUI, HEGEMONIC TRANSFORMATION: THE STATE, LAWS, AND
LABOUR RELATIONS IN POST-SOCIALIST CHINA 97 (2018):

By giving the labor market, the labor contract system‚ and capital-labor
relations a form of equality, fairness‚ andlegality, the labor law system
hides its own tendencies and those of the party-state towards the
capitalists, masking the economic differences between the conflicting
classes and fragmenting the Chinese workers into individualized legal
subjects.
See also Elaine Sio-ieng Hui, The Labour Law System, Capitalist Hegemony and Class
Politics in China, 226 CHINA Q. 431, 436 (2016) (discussing how “the Chinese labour
law system has helped to reproduce capitalist hegemony”).
53
The LCL is only effective if the courts are robust in enforcing its provisions
and interpreting it in such a way that defends labor rights. Any meaningful
discussion must therefore go beyond the black-letter law and explain how the
involvement of the judiciary and other institutions/players shape the employee
protection regime. See Laszlo Goerke & Michael Neugart, Lobbying and Dismissal
Dispute Resolution Systems, 41 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 50, 50 (2015). For the approach
of courts dealing with labor protests in China, see Yang Su & Xin He, Street as
Courtroom: State Accommodation of Labor Protest in South China, 44 L. & SOC’Y REV.
157, 157 (2010) (finding that courts and relevant government agencies “engage
protestors on the street, which often grants a favorable resolution”).
54
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 39(2). The
dismissal will be without compensation and without notice, which is permitted
under the LCL.
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that employees are winning in litigation, 55 this study finds that
employers have come out ahead by a substantial margin in labor
disputes lawsuits (Serious Breach Dismissal Cases). 56 This study
shows that despite the “pro-labor” established perception, the
Chinese courts are, in fact, “pro-employer.”
Section II begins with outlining the debate on whether Chinese
courts are pro-labor or pro-employer. The rationale behind the prolabor and pro-employer propositions are explored. The established
perception that Chinese courts are pro-labor is explained. The
chapter also introduces the relevance of Galanter’s party capability
theory in Chinese labor dispute lawsuits. Section III explains the
legal background of Serious Breach Dismissal Cases in China. The
relative underdevelopment of Chinese law on unfair dismissal is
examined from a comparative perspective. Section IV outlines the
methodology used in this study and introduces the dataset. It also
provides an overview of the independent and dependent variables
of this study. Section V sets out the findings and analysis of this
study. The key finding is that employers have won by a substantial
margin.57 Another important finding is that courts in most cases
failed to conduct a substantive review on the fairness of the
dismissal (“fairness review”).58 Section VI is the discussion section,
which examines how the data supports the conclusion that Chinese
courts are pro-employer. It also provides practical reasons why
courts did not conduct a fairness review and explains the
relationship between legal representation and case outcome. The
Article concludes by exploring the implications of this study,
highlighting the significance of this study’s contribution.

55
56
57
58

See infra Section II.B.
See infra Table 4.
See infra Table 4.
See infra Table 28a.
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DEBATING WHETHER CHINESE COURTS ARE PRO-LABOR
OR PRO-EMPLOYER, THE ESTABLISHED PRO-LABOR
PERCEPTION, AND THE RELEVANCE OF THE PARTY
CAPABILITY THEORY

a. Are Chinese Courts Pro-Labor or Pro-Employer: Two Propositions
Two propositions can be advanced in relation to Chinese courts’
inclination in adjudicating labor disputes. The first is that Chinese
courts are pro-labor and follow the “tilted protection” principle
enshrined in labor statutes. The second is that, despite the pro-labor
stance of China’s statutory law, courts remain pro-employer in
practice.
The rationale that supports the pro-labor proposition has a
number of levels. First, Chinese courts are subservient to the
legislature in China’s constitutional order.59 Judges in China work
under a very strict system of judicial accountability for error60 and
are evaluated against a stringent set of quantitative parameters.61 In
interpreting legislation, Chinese courts cannot “reinvent” the law.
Unlike the discretion given to their common law counterparts in
interpreting legislation, Chinese courts are bound to give effect to
the letter of the law in a statute and its legislative intentions. It is,
therefore, logical to expect that the pro-labor inclination of the LCL
and other labor statutes would influence (or even dictate) judicial
outcomes. Second, Chinese courts are swayed by ideology more so
59
See, e.g., supra note 38, at 159 (stating that "the legislature has de jure control
over the judiciary").
60
See Peter C.H. Chan & Huina Xiao, A Typology of Judicial Liability for Error in
Chinese Courts, 51 H.K.L.J. 309, 310 (2021); see also Carl Minzner, Judicial Disciplinary
Systems for Incorrectly Decided Cases: The Imperial Chinese Heritage Lives On, 39 N.M.L.
REV. 63, 67-69 (2009) (discussing Chinese courts’ adoption of responsibility
systems); Wang Lungang (王伦刚) & Liu Sida (刘思达), Cong Shiti Wenze Dao
Chengxu Zhi Zhi: Zhongguo Fayuan Cuo’An Zhuijiuzhi Yunxing De Shizheng Kaocha (
从实体问责到程序之治 —— 中国法院错案追究制运行的实证考察 ) [From Physical
Accountability to Procedural Governance: An Empirical Examination of the Operation of
China’s Court Error Accountability System], FAUXEJIA (法学家) [JURIST], no. 2, 2016, at
27, 28-30 (exploring the development of the accountability system).
61
See Kwai Hang Ng & Peter C.H. Chan, “What Gets Measured Gets Done”:
Metric Fixation and China’s Experiment in Quantified Judging, ASIAN J.L. & SOC’Y 1, 1-3
(2021) (introducing the Case Quality Assessment System (CQAS), a metric used for
judging judges in China); see also Jonathan J. Kinkel & William J. Hurst, The Judicial
Cadre Evaluation System in China: From Quantification to Intra-State Legibility, 224
CHINA Q. 933, 933-37 (2015) (explaining CQAS).
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than their common law or Western counterparts. With the socialist
ideologically driven labor policies of the state, courts cannot turn a
blind eye to these ideological attributes in adjudication. When the
state propagates the importance of giving special protection to
workers,62 the courts must give effect to the policy objectives of the
state. Third, the judiciary’s institutional concern is that if labor is not
given special protection, losing employee litigants (especially in
collective disputes)63 will resort to citizens’ petition (xinfang)64 and
other means to voice their discontent, 65 thereby creating social
instability. Given the socio-political embeddedness of Chinese
courts66 and the stability maintenance role courts play in China,67 it
is logical to expect the judiciary to favor employees out of stability
maintenance concerns. Finally, Chinese courts may side with the
employee litigants (the weaker party) as a strategic maneuver to
establish the courts’ own legitimacy.68 It is not unusual for courts in
developing countries to side with the “have-nots” in an attempt to

62

See Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Goujian Hexie Laodong Guanxi De Yijian (

中 共 中 央 国 务 院 关 于 构 建 和 谐 劳 动 关 系 的 意 见 ) [Opinions of the CPC Central

Committee and State Council on Building Harmonious Labor Relations], PKULAW (Mar.
21,
2015),
https://www.pkulaw.com/chl/339cc0fe5583e0bbbdfb.html
[https://perma.cc/4RZ2-BEE6].
63
For a typology of labor disputes in China, see generally Feng Chen &
Mengxiao Tang, Labor Conflicts in China: Typologies and Their Implications, 53 ASIAN
SURV. 559 (2013) (classifying labor disputes into three categories: disputes over
“legal rights”; disputes over “interests”; and disputes over “pre-reform
entitlements”).
64
For an explanation of the role of xinfang in China’s judicial politics, see KWAI
HANG NG & XIN HE, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN CHINA 126128 (2017); see also Yuqing Feng & Xin He, From Law to Politics: Petitioners’ Framing
of Disputes in Chinese Courts, 80 CHINA J. 130, 131-33 (2018) (explaining xinfang).
65
For an updated review on the (informal) approach of worker strikes in
China, see generally Wei Chen, Informal Strike Organization in South China: The
Worker Representative Mechanism, Sustained Leadership, and Strike Outcomes, 20 CHINA
REV. 109 (2020).
66
See Ng & He, supra note 64, at 191 (summarizing political and social
embeddedness of Chinese courts).
67 See, e.g., Carl F. Minzner, China’s Turn Against Law, 59 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 935,
935-39 (2011) (discussing how Chinese authorities are using the Chinese judiciary
to uphold social stability); Yuhua Wang & Carl F. Minzner, The Rise of the Chinese
Security State, 222 CHINA Q. 339, 339-40 (2015) (suggesting that Chinese authorities
reworked their political-legal apparatus for “stability maintenance”).
68
See Peter C.H. Chan, Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead in Chinese Grassroots
Courts? Rural Land Disputes Between Married-Out Women and Village Collectives, 71
Hastings L.J. 1, 77 (2019) ("[T]he courts may have also sided with the MOW litigants
as a strategic consideration to establish the courts’ own legitimacy through
protecting the weak.").
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enhance “their own legitimacy and stability within the political
system.”69
The rationale that supports the pro-employer proposition has a
number of levels. First, while government policies have a socialist
undertone, China’s labor system is also a product of the market
economy. Courts cannot blindly follow socialist rhetoric and must
consider business efficacy in their decisions. Employing a pro-labor
stance will jeopardize the pragmatic objective to promote
commercial efficiency. In fact, informants in this study have
consistently expressed the importance of honoring “corporate
autonomy” in adjudication to avoid upsetting the employers’
commercial decisions, including dismissal decisions.70 Second, the
dominating role of capital in a market-driven economy (and the
impact it has on the labor regime) cannot be ignored.71 Courts are
subject to the socio-political realities of the locality. If local
governments go a long way to protect the rights of governmentconnected enterprises, it would not be illogical to expect courts to be
pro-employer.72 Businesses can cause trouble as well. The result
may not be in the form of petitions or protest, but in the form of
political retaliation. This concern is particularly real for small local
district courts which depended greatly on the local government for
political and financial resources. Finally, while one study found that
Chinese grassroots courts sided with the “have-nots” in rural land
disputes, 73 another found that the “haves” prevailed in Shanghai
courts.74 The truth is, Chinese courts do not always side with the
weaker party, even though there could be reasons (institutional or
otherwise) to do so in certain types of cases.

69
Stacia L. Haynie, Resource Inequalities and Litigation Outcomes in the Philippine
Supreme Court, 56 J. POL. 752, 753 (1994).
70
See Informant ID: 2020.07.09.1, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.07.20.9,
supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.06.17.6, supra note 17.
71
See Hui, The Labour Law System, Capitalist Hegemony and Class Politics in
China, supra note 52Error! Bookmark not defined..
72
One informant said that Nanjing courts are relatively lenient towards
employees, while Shenzhen courts are vigorously pro-employer. Informant ID:
2020.07.09.3, supra note 17.
73
See Chan, supra note 68, at 77.
74
See e.g., Xin He & Yang Su, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in Shanghai
Courts?, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 120, 131-33 (2013) (finding that stronger parties
win more often and by a large margin).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

300

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 43:2

b. The Established Perception: Chinese Courts are Pro-Labor
The established perception is that Chinese courts are pro-labor.
It is not difficult to find official policies of local courts on the
judiciary’s pro-labor stance.75 Existing literature supports the claim
that Chinese courts are pro-labor. In particular, past empirical
studies have generally found that employees prevailed in labor
dispute litigations. 76 Studies have also found that employees
75 See, e.g., Daxing Fayuan Shenzhi Xianjie Peihe Qieshi Weihu Laodongzhe Hefa
Quanyi ( 大兴法院审执衔接配合切实维护劳动者合法权益 ) [Daxing court trial and
enforcement cooperation to effectively protect the legitimate rights and interests of workers],
ZHONGGUO FAXUEYUAN WANG ( 中 国 法 院 网 ) [CHINACOURT] (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2018/04/id/3282709.shtml
[https://perma.cc/7KL6-Y2QW];
Yangzhongshi
Sifaju
Sanjucuo
Chengqi
Nongmingong Gongzi Baohusan ( 扬中市司法局“ 三举措 ” 撑起农民工工资“ 保护伞 ”)
[Yangzhong City Judicial Bureau’s “Three Initiatives” to Support the “Protective
Umbrella” of Migrant Workers’ Wages], FARUN JIANGSU (法润江苏) [JSCHINA] (June 8,
2020), http://frjs.jschina.com.cn/31022/31034/202006/t20200608_6679067.shtml
[https://perma.cc/U76E-FJ7C].
76
See Fu Hualing & D.W. Choy, From Mediation to Adjudication: Settling Labor
Disputes in China, 3 CHINA RTS. F. 17, 21 (2004) (reporting that employees prevailed
in court litigation between 1995 and 2001, and in certain courts (such as Ningbo and
Zhongshan), employees’ success rate was as high as over ninety percent); Chen &
Xu, supra note 32 (finding that Chinese courts are able to side with the employee in
individual labor disputes as the dispute are non-politically sensitive, but are hostile
towards labor collective actions given the political sensitivity of such actions);
Wang Li (王莉) & Yang Xue (杨雪), Xietiao Laodong Guanxi Goujian Hexie Shehui—Yi
Shanghai Shi Laodong Zhengyi Shizheng Yanjiu Wei Li (协调劳动关系 构建和谐社会—
以 上 海 市 劳 动 争 议 实 证 研 究 为 例 ) [Coordinating Labor Relations and Building a
Harmonious Society—Taking Empirical Research on Labor Disputes in Shanghai as an
Example], Keji Qingbao Kaifa Yu Jingji (科技情报开发与经济) [SCI-TECH. INFO. DEV.
ECON.], no. 16, 2006, at 97, 97 (finding that employees came out ahead in labor
dispute lawsuits in Shanghai); Wang, Cheng & Lü, supra note 12, at 120 (finding
that with legal representation, the employees come out ahead in labor dispute
lawsuits); Li Xin (李馨), Youli Yuanze Zai Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Zhong De Shiyong
(“ 有利原则 ” 在劳动争议案件中的适用 ) [The Application of “Favorable Principle” in
Labor Dispute Cases], RENMIN SIFA (人民司法) [PEOPLE’S JUST.] no. 14, 2015, at 45, 46
(explaining that courts adopt an approach that gives employees an advantage in
labor dispute litigation); Yan, supra note 12, at 1282 (finding that employees’
winning rate was as high as seventy percent and that legal representation increases
the chances of success for employees); Qin Guorong (秦国荣), Yongren Danwei
Yiwu: Zeren Fanwei Yu Lifa Luoji (用人单位义务: 责任范围与立法逻辑) [Employer’s
Obligations: Scope of Responsibility and Legislative Logic], FAZHI YANJIU (法治研究)
[RSCH. RULE L.], no. 3, 2018, at 109, 110 (stating that courts and labor dispute
arbitration tribunals are sympathetic towards employees and would not hesitate to
bend procedural rules in favor of employees during hearings); Tong Ji ( 佟季),
Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Qingkuang Fenxi (劳动争议案件情况分析) [Analysis of the
Situation of Labor Dispute Cases], RENMIN SIFA (人民司法) [PEOPLE’S JUST.], no. 5, 2008,
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prevailed in labor dispute arbitration proceedings.77 These findings
echo court reports that confirm employees were prevailing in labor
dispute arbitration and court cases. 78 Informants in this study
at 69, 70 (finding that employees have consistently prevailed over employers in
court litigation in a number of local courts); Wang Zhiwei (王智嵬), Zhao Jilun (赵
继伦) & Yu Guilan (于桂兰), Woguo Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Shuliang Zengzhang
Zhuangkuang Yu Yuanyin: Jiyu 1991-2016 Nian Xiangguan Shuju De Shizheng Fenxi (
我国劳动争议案件数量增长状况与原因— 基于 1991-2016 年相关数据的实证分析 )
[The Growth Status and Reasons of the Number of Labor Dispute Cases in China—An
Empirical Analysis Based on Relevant Data from 1991-2016], SHANDONG DAXUE XUEBAO
ZHEXUE SHEHUIKEXUE BAN (山东大学学报(哲学社会科学版)) [J. SHANDONG U. (SOC.
SCI. ED)], no. 5, 2020, at 64, 68 (finding that during the two decades between 1996
and 2016, employees have consistently prevailed in court litigation in sixteen
provinces in China).
77
See Fu & Choy, supra note 76, at 19 (showing that employees came out ahead
in labor arbitration proceedings between 1996 and 2002 and that employees from
the private sector have a higher winning rate than their counterparts in state-owned
enterprises or public institutions); see Yu Qin (余琴) & Zhuang Wenjia (庄文嘉),
Gaige Kaifang 40 Nian De Laodong Lifa Difang Tiaojie Yu Zhengyi Chuzhi: Jiyu Laodong
Zhengyi Shengsulü De Shizheng Fenxi (改革开放 40 年来的劳动立法、地方调解与争
议处置 — 基于劳动争议胜诉率的实证分析 ) [Labor Legislation, Local Mediation and
Dispute Disposition in the Past 40 Years of Reform and Open Policy: An Empirical
Analysis Based on the Winning Rate of Labor Disputes], ZHONGSHAN DAXUE XUEBAO
SHEHUIKEXUE BAN (中山大学学报(社会科学版)) [J. SUN YAT-SEN U. (SOC. SCI. ED.)], no.
3, 2018, at 171, 171 (finding that while employees’ success rates in arbitration has
decreased in recent years, employees still came out ahead by substantial margins);
Ji Yueting (嵇月婷), Chai Jing (柴静), Li Yanjun (李彦君) & Tang Kuang (唐鑛),
Laodong Zhengyi Zhongcai Zhong lushi Daili Qingkuang Dui Zhongcai Jieguo De
Yingxiang (劳动争议仲裁中律师代理情况对仲裁结果的影响 ) [The Impact of Attorney
Representation in Labor Dispute Arbitration on Arbitration Outcomes], ZHONGGUO RENLI
ZIYUAN KAIFA (中国人力资源开发) [CHINA HUM. RES. DEV.], no. 12, 2017, at 156, 165
(finding that legal representation increases the chances of success of employees in
labor dispute arbitration).
78 See, e.g., Chen Jinlu (陈金路), Liaocheng Laodong Zhengyi Baogao: Siqi Yi
Fasheng Zhengyi Anjian, Laodongzhe Shengsulu Gao (聊城劳动争议报告：私企易发生
争议案件,劳动者胜诉率高 ) [Liaocheng Labor Dispute Report: Private Enterprises Are
Prone to Disputes, and Workers Have a High Rate of Winning Lawsuits], DAZHONGWANG
(
大
众
网
)
[DZWWW]
(Jan.
10,
2017), http://www.dzwww.com/shandong/sdnews/201701/t20170110_1540827
0 [https://perma.cc/T8EA-4BTF]. The success rate of employees at Chongqing
Fifth Intermediate Court was as high as ninety-five percent. Laodongzhe Shengsulu
Chao Jiucheng (劳动者胜诉率超九成) [Laborers Win over 90 Percent of Cases], SOUHU
XINWEN
( 搜 狐 新 闻 )
[SOHU
NEWS]
(MAY
2,
2011),
http://news.sohu.com/20110502/n280471299.shtml
[https://perma.cc/ZMJ2M7L6]. In Jiaqing City (Zhejiang Province), employees won 86.3% of all labor
dispute arbitrations in the first half of 2014. Jinnian Shangbannian Quanshi Laodong
Renshi Zhongcai Jigou Shouli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian 1007 Jian (今年上半年全市劳动
人事仲裁机构受理劳动争议案件 1007 件) [The City’s Labor Arbitration Institutions
Received 1007 Labor Dispute Cases in the First Half of This Year], ZHEJIANG ZAIXIAN (浙
江
在
线
) [ZHEJIANG
ONLINE])
(Aug.
13,
2014),
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confirm that litigation fees of employee litigants 79 (which are
already very low)80 are frequently waived by courts.81 This practice
substantially improved employee litigants’ access to court. Most
informants who were interviewed have the overall impression that
Chinese courts are pro-labor. 82 Some informants have said that
Chinese courts are more or less neutral with no particular inclination
towards labor or employer (or the courts seek to strike a balance
between the two parties).83 Not a single informant views Chinese
courts as pro-employer. An informant noted that courts are clearly
pro-labor as the employer has a greater evidential burden to
discharge than employees in labor lawsuits.84 Some informants in
this study85 recognized the evidential difficulty employees face (as
they have less resources) and confirmed that judges are aware of this
http://jx.zjol.com.cn/system/2014/08/13/020196900_01.shtml
[https://perma.cc/3V99-ADLX]. According to official statistics on labor dispute
arbitration in Shanghai (around 2004), employees’ claims were supported eightysix percent of the time. Shanghai: Laodong Jiufen Laodongzhe Shengsulu Gaoyu Yongren
Danwei (上海：劳动纠纷劳动者胜诉率高于用人单位) [Shanghai: Labor Disputes Have
a Higher Winning Rate for Workers than for Employers], ZHONGQING ZAIXIAN (中青在
线 ) [CHINA YOUTH ONLINE] (Oct. 30, 2004), http://zqb.cyol.com/content/200410/30/content_977452.htm [https://perma.cc/EFR5-GM2H].
The Hangzhou
Intermediate Court, in hearing labor disputes appeals, have ruled in favor of
employees over ninety percent of the time during the period between January 2010
and September 2013. Hangzhou Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Laofang Shengsulu Chao 9
cheng Suqiu Yuelaiyue Duoyanghua (杭州劳动争议案件劳方胜诉率超 9 成 诉求越来越
多样化) [Labor Side Wins More Than 90% of Hangzhou Labor Dispute Cases, Claims
Becoming More Diverse], ZHEJIANG ZAIXIAN (浙江在线) [ZHEJIANG ONLINE] (Dec. 11,
2013),
https://zjnews.zjol.com.cn/system/2013/12/11/019753827.shtml
[https://perma.cc/TL8G-EBES].
79
Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa ( 诉 讼 费 用 交 纳 办 法 ) [Measures on the
Payment of Litigation Costs] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 19, 2006,
effective
Apr.
1,
2007),
art.
13,
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/200612/29/content_483407.htm [https://perma.cc/ZQ6W-5TZT].
80
The filing fee for labor dispute lawsuits is just RMB 10. Enforcement fees
range from RMB 50 to 500. Property preservation fee is RMB 30.
81
Informant ID: 2020.07.09.2, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.08.11, supra
note 17.
82
Informant ID: 2020.07.09.1, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.06.17.3, supra
note 17; Informant ID: 2020.07.09.3, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.07.09.2, supra
note 17; Informant ID: 2020.06.17.6, supra note 17. Sixty percent of the informants
who responded to the questionnaire were of the view that the LCL must be
interpreted by the courts in a manner that favors the employees in order to fully
reflect the pro-labor nature of the LCL.
83
Informant ID: 2020.07.09.2, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.08.11, supra
note 17.
84
Informant ID: 2020.06.17.3, supra note 17.
85
Informant ID: 2020.06.17.3, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.06.17.9, supra
note 17.
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power imbalance when adjudicating labor disputes.86 It has been
argued that Chinese courts generally adopt an adjudicatory
approach that favors employees. There are two aspects to this
approach. First, when a contractual term in a labor contract is
unclear, the court should interpret it in a way that favors the
employee. Second, when the labor statute is unclear, the court
should interpret the law in a way that favors the employee.87 An
internal report supplied by an informant 88 concerning serious
breach dismissals lawsuits (between 2017 and 2019) in a suburban
district court in Beijing indicated employees have won by a
substantial margin.89
While existing research overwhelmingly found employees
winning in labor disputes, one study found employers have
generally prevailed over employees in Shanghai courts (“He and Su
Study”). 90 The margin of victory for the employer is more
significant when the employee is a “farmer” (i.e., a migrant worker)
and less significant when the employee is a “white collar” worker.91
The He and Su Study, however, should be read within the context
of its data. First, it is geographically limited to Shanghai and is
unlikely to be representative on a national level.92 It is not illogical
to expect Shanghai courts to lean towards business (the employer)
86
For instance, employees may not have the means to retain a lawyer to assist
with fact-finding. The power imbalance also suggests that employees are in a
weaker position in gathering evidence (e.g., employment related documentation
and records are maintained and controlled by the employer).
87
See Xu Jianyu (许建宇), Youli Yuanze De Tichu Jiqi Zai Laodong Hetong Fa
Zhongde Shiyong (“有利原则”的提出及其在劳动合同法中的适用) [The Introduction of
the “Favorable Principle” and its Application in the Employment Contract Law], FAXUE (
法学) [LEGAL SCI.], no. 5, 2006, at 90, 91. For a case example demonstrating this
approach, see Gao Yiming Su Beijing Bide Chuangzhan Tongxun Jishu Youxian
Gongsi Laodong Hetong Jiufen An (高轶明诉北京比德创展通讯技术有限公司劳动
合同纠纷案) [Gao Yiming v. Beijing Bide Chuangzhan Communication Co., Ltd.
Labor Contract Dispute], 2008 People's Just. Case 24 (Beijing Chaoyang District
People’s Ct. 2008) (China).
88
Informant ID: 2020.06.17.3, supra note 17.
89
The report noted that the employees won seventy-six percent of the time
among cases adjudicated between 2017 and 2019 (there were in total 123 cases). The
main reason for courts finding for the employee was that the employer was unable
to prove that there was a serious breach of the internal regulations.
90
He & Su, supra note 74.
91
He & Su, supra note 74, at 131-32.
92
This Article surveys national data of every court in China. One limitation,
however, is that this Article focuses on Serious Breach Dismissal Cases only, while
the He and Su Study surveyed labor disputes generally. See He & Su, supra note
74, at 127 (explaining that the sample used in the research was selected randomly
from twelve issue areas).
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given Shanghai is the leading business hub in China. This does not
necessarily mean that courts in other parts of China favor employers
(particularly rural courts or courts in less developed regions).
Second, there are only 284 labor dispute cases in the He and Su
Study, which is a rather small sample to be representative.93 Third,
the employer does not always prevail. When the employer sues the
blue-collar worker, the worker prevails.94
c. How Does Galanter’s Party Capability Theory Fit into This Debate?
Since Marc Galanter devised the theory on party capability, 95
extensive scholarship has emerged to test the theory in different
jurisdictions and under various circumstances. 96 In the simplest
terms, the theory suggest that the party with more extensive
experience, greater resources and superior status (the “haves”)
prevails over the party with limited experience, less resources and
inferior status (the “have-nots”) in litigation.97 The party capability
theory was tested in China in a number of studies with varying

He & Su, supra note 74, at 135.
He & Su, supra note 74, at 132.
95
See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974) (analyzing different kinds
of parties and the effect these differences might have).
96
See generally Yoav Dotan, Do the "Haves" Still Come out Ahead? Resource
Inequalities in Ideological Courts: The Case of the Israeli High Court of Justice, 33 L. &
SOC'Y. REV. 1059 (1999) (finding out the litigation outcomes before the Israeli High
Court of Justice); Kathryn Hendley, Randi Ryterman & Peter Murrell, Do Repeat
Players Behave Differently in Russia? Contractual and Litigation Behavior of Russian
Enterprises, 33 L. & SOC'Y. REV. 833 (1999) (examining "whether Galanter's repeat
player concept helps in deciphering the law-related behavior of Russian
enterprises"); Reginald S. Sheehan & Kirk A. Randazzo, Explaining Litigant Success
in the High Court of Australia, 47 AUSTL. J. POL. SCI. 239 (2012) (exploring party
capability theory in the High Court of Australia); Haynie, supra note 69 (extending
the comparative analysis to Philippines); Peter McCormick, Party Capacity Theory
and Appellate Success in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1949-1992, 26 CAN. J. POL. SCI.
523 (1993) (analyzing the decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada regarding to
party capability theory).
97
See Galanter, supra note 95, at 97–104:
93

94

[T]hose with other advantages [haves] tend to occupy this position of
advantage and to have their other advantages reinforced and augmented.
This position of advantage is one of the ways in which a legal system
formally neutral as between “haves” and “have-nots” may perpetuate and
augment the advantages of the form.
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outcomes.98 The present study provides a ground to further test the
party capability theory in China in the context of labor dispute
resolution. In serious breach dismissal lawsuits, the employees
(very likely to be “one-shotters”) are clearly the “have-nots”, while
the employers (very likely to be “repeat players”) are the “haves.” 99
In an earlier study by the author, one vital element that allowed the
“have-nots” to prevail by a substantial margin was that Chinese
grassroots courts “favored” the “have-nots” over the “haves.” It
was this “judicial favor” for have-nots that “neutralized the partycapability advantages enjoyed by the ‘haves’” and allowed the havenots to come out ahead.100 Will the same judicial favor for the “havenots” appear in Serious Breach Dismissal Cases? If Chinese courts
do not favor employees (the “have-nots”), it is unlikely that the
employees would prevail. In other words, if courts are not pro-labor
(or even worse, if courts are pro-employer), the employees (“havenots”) are very likely to lose.
III.

SERIOUS BREACH DISMISSAL CASES: AN OVERVIEW

Dismissal of the employee under the LCL requires cause. 101
China is, on paper, categorically against at-will employment. 102
However, unlike common law jurisdictions where jurisprudence on

98
See, e.g., He & Su, supra note 74 (discovering that the “haves” came out
ahead by substantial margin); Xifen Lin & Wei Shen, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead
in China’s Prisons?—An Empirical Study of China’s Commutation Procedures, 48 INT'L.
J.L. CRIME & JUST. 1, 1 (2017) (finding that “haves” prisoners have “higher chances
of commutation”); Chan, supra note 68, at 1 (revealing that the “have-nots”
prevailed in rural land dispute lawsuits).
99
See Galanter, supra note 95, at 97–104 (categorizing parties in a legal system
as one-shotters (OS) and repeat players (RP) and noting that in America, most RPs
are larger and powerful than OSs, creating an overlap between RPs and "haves" and
between OSs and "have-nots.").
100
Chan, supra note 68, at 68-69.
101
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 39-40.
102
Some argue that jurisdictions that are against at-will employment may
only be so on paper, as in practice courts sometimes do not enforce the law that
forbids employers dismissing employees without cause. See Samuel Estreicher &
Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Comparative Wrongful Dismissal Law: Reassessing American
Exceptionalism, 92 N.C.L. REV. 343, 350 (2014) (claiming that actual practices in
countries surveyed for the study “frequently results in less protection” and that
challenges to dismissal may be difficult).
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unfair dismissal is well established,103 neither the LCL nor any other
Chinese labor statutes provided guidance on what constitutes unfair
dismissal. This study focuses on Article 39(2) of the LCL, as it is one
of the most controversial provisions in the current Chinese labor
legislative regime.104 Under Article 39(2) of the LCL, the employer
is entitled to terminate the employment contract if the employee had
“seriously breached” the internal regulations of the employer, in
which case, the employee is dismissed without compensation and
without notice. But if the employer unfairly or wrongfully dismisses
an employee, the employer must provide compensation.105 The test
for unfair dismissal, however, is not provided in Article 39(2), nor
any other provisions in the LCL. Therefore, the court must
determine on its own what constitutes fair and unfair dismissal
under Article 39(2) of the LCL. Two judicial interpretations of the
Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”) conferred the court power to
review the employer’s decision to dismiss. First, if the employer
unilaterally dismisses an employee but failed to notify the relevant
labor union,106 the court must award compensation to the employee
(this provides some procedural safeguard for the employee) (“SPC
2013 Interpretation”).107 Second, if the employer is “really wrong”
(or clearly in error) (确有错误) in dismissing the employee, the court
can revoke the dismissal (this confers substantive review powers on
the court to assess whether or not the dismissal was wrongful or

103
See generally JOHN BOWERS & CAROL DAVIS, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
(2010) (introducing the relative law with an array of helpful checklists); Murray
Wilcox QC, Unfair Dismissal Cases, 18 ECON. & LAB. RELS. REV. 79 (2008) (explaining
two key points about the design of the unfair dismissal legislation).
104
See Cheng & Ke, supra note 26, at 10 (noting that at the local level, judicial
interpretations of Article 39 vary).
105
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 87.
106
Labor unions in China are organized under the All China Federation of
Trade Unions.
107
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Shiyong
Falü Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi Si (最高人民法院关于审理劳动争议案件适用法律若干
问题的解释（四）) [Interpretation (IV) of the Supreme People's Court of Several
Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases] (promulgated
by the Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Dec. 31, 2012, effective Feb. 1, 2013), art.
12,
Sup.
People’s
Ct.
Gaz.,
Jan.
18,
2013,
http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/Details/811bdac65d1992d26d60339c558077.html
[https://perma.cc/H6TP-79RC] (China) (repealed Jan. 1, 2021). Under the LCL,
prior to the dismissal, the employer must notify the relevant labor union of its
decision to dismiss and the reasons for the dismissal. Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合
同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 43.
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unfair) (“SPC 2008 Interpretation”). 108 SPC 2008 Interpretation
confers not only the power to review the fairness of the dismissal,
but also an obligation to conduct a fairness review. The provision,
on the face, seems only permissive in that the court can revoke the
dismissal if there is a clear error. But by implication, the court must
have done a fairness review before it is in a position to revoke the
dismissal. This “fairness review” is not an option, it is an obligation.
Serious Breach Dismissal Cases are critically important in the
study of China’s labor rights because the ground of serious breach
of employer’s internal regulations under Article 39(2) of the LCL is
most prone to manipulation by the employer in summarily and
unfairly dismissing employees without compensation. 109 Article
39(2) of the LCL does not define what constitutes “serious breach”
(nor does any other statutory provision or SPC interpretation).
Common sense dictates that “serious breach” is usually connected
to some form of employee “misconduct” such as absenteeism,
lateness, disobedience, use of violence, or abusive language in the
workplace. However, the complete lack of objective standards as to
what constitutes “serious breach” creates a lacuna in which
employers are at liberty to regard even trivial breaches as serious
breaches, thereby subjecting employees to very unreasonable
standards.110 To date, no guidance has been given by the SPC on
how lower courts should interpret Article 39(2) of the LCL in a way
that will not subject employees to unfair dismissal. For instance,
when would the internal regulations of the employer be so
unreasonable that dismissal based on such regulation would
definitely amount to unfair dismissal? Would a technical breach of
108
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Shiyong
Falü Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi Yi (最高人民法院关于审理劳动争议案件适用法律若干
问题的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues about
the Application of Laws for the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases] (promulgated by the
Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Apr. 16, 2001, effective Apr. 30, 2001), art. 20，
Sup.
People’s
Ct.
Gaz., Dec. 16, 2008, https://www.pkulaw.com/chl/210739e42639bd53bdfb.html
[https://perma.cc/3EDR-3KTT] (China) (repealed Jan. 1, 2021).
109
The employee has to compensate the employer (for breach of the
employment contract) if the employee is dismissed under Article 39(2) of the LCL.
Laodong Hetong Fa Shishi Tiaoli ( 劳 动 合 同 法 实 施 条 例 ) [Implementation
Regulations for the Labor Contract Law] (promulgated by the St. Council, Sept. 18,
2008, effective Sep. 18, 2008), art. 26, ST. COUNCIL GAZ., Sept. 18, 2008,
http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2008/content_1107604.htm
[https://perma.cc/AH2A-5QXZ] (China).
110
Li Jianfei (黎建飞), Laodong Hetong Jiechu De Nan Yu Yi (劳动合同解除的难
与易) [The Difficulty and Ease of Dissolving Employment Contracts], FAXUEJIA (法学家)
[THE JURIST], no. 2, 2008, at 18, 20-21.
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an internal regulation be purposefully interpreted by the employer
as “serious breach” resulting in the unfair dismissal of the
employee? This glaring gap in the law in China is contrasted with
the well-established jurisprudence on dismissal on the basis of the
employee’s misconduct in common law jurisdictions. In England,
the employer can only legally dismiss an employee for misconduct
when: (a) the employer believed that the employee was guilty of
misconduct; (b) the employer had in mind reasonable grounds upon
which to sustain that belief; and (c) at the stage at which that belief
was formed on those grounds, it has carried out as much
investigation into the matter as was reasonable in the circumstances
(the Burchell test).111 Unless it is “gross misconduct,” a summary
dismissal is considered “unfair” if the employer failed to give proper
warning or notice to the employee. 112 Under English law, a
dismissal based on misconduct would be considered unfair if proper
procedures are not followed. Proper procedures would normally
involve a reasonable investigation of the alleged misconduct in
question and a fair hearing for the employee to argue his or her
case.113
The underdevelopment of unfair dismissal jurisprudence in
China is glaringly obvious in that no detailed substantive or
procedural safeguards are provided under Chinese law to ensure
that a dismissal is fair (and hence not wrongful). Article 39(2) of the
LCL simply gives too much discretion to the employer, leaving the
employee’s job security at the total mercy of the employer (and
giving the employer an opportunity to abuse its powers under
Article 39(2)). If the employee is unfairly dismissed under Article
39(2), does the court take a proactive role in remedying the situation
by either restoring employment or providing compensation to the
employee? Or would the court simply confirm whatever the
employer does so long as there is not a breach of the employer’s
internal rules (i.e. deferring completely to the employer)? Would
the court assess whether the employer’s internal regulations are
British Home Stores Ltd. v. Burchell [1978
] ICR 303 (Eng.).
BSC Sports & Soc. Club v. Morgan [1987] IRLR 391 (Eng.); MPI Ltd. v.
Woodland [2007] All ER (D) 100 (Eng.). In these cases, the courts were trying to
distinguish between unfair dismissal and wrongful dismissal. Even though a
summary dismissal may be fair, it can be wrongful.
113
Polkey v. A.E. Dayton Servs. Ltd. [1988] ICR 142 (Eng.); see also IDS,
EMPLOYMENT LAW HANDBOOK: UNFAIR DISMISSAL 104-08 (2010) (listing the
procedural steps necessary to show that an employer acted reasonably in a conduct
dismissal).
111

112
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reasonable, 114 and decide whether the alleged breach is indeed a
“serious breach”? The above questions cannot be properly
answered unless one conducts a comprehensive quantitative
analysis of Serious Breach Dismissal Cases for the whole of
Mainland China. To date, no such empirical study has been
conducted.115 This study seeks to fill this gap.
IV.

DATA, METHODOLOGY, AND VARIABLES

a. Data and Methodology
This study coded a representative sample of “documents of
adjudication decisions” (DADs) 116 of Serious Breach Dismissal
Cases during the period between 2010-2018. 117 Using the China
Judgments Online search system, a search was conducted on July 16,
2019 using search terms of “Serious Breach of the Employing Unit’s
Internal Regulations and System” (严重违反用人单位的规章制度)
and “Article 39” (第三十九条) in a whole document search and with
the search limited to court documents of first-instance civil
judgments at basic-level courts in relation to labor disputes (劳动争
议). The search generated 6,539 DADs, which covers the time period
114
Article 4 of the LCL provides some standards for the employer’s internal
regulations, for example, internal regulations must be made known to the employee
(although the regulations do not form part of the employment contract). See Yan
Tian ( 阎 天 ), Laodong Guizhang Xingzhi Sanfenshuo: Yi Bili Yuanze Wei Jianyan
Biaozhun ( 劳动规章性质三分说：以比例原则为检验标准 ) [The Three-dimensional
Nature of Labor Regulations: The principle of Proportionality as the Test], JIAODA FAXUE (
交大法学) [S.J.T.U.L. REV.], no. 4, 2017, at 34, 36 n.8 (noting that Article 4 of the LCL
requires the employers to disclose rules). In any event, the lower courts are not
given any clear procedural guidance on the enforcement of Article 4 of the LCL. See
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art 4. Also, Article 4 is
seldom relied upon by the court in deciding Serious Breach Dismissal Cases. The
reality is that, in practice, there is virtually no enforcement mechanism to ensure
the employer’s internal regulations are reasonable and non-oppressive to the
employee.
115
A limited quantitative study was conducted for Beijing, Shanghai, and
Guangdong. Cheng & Ke, supra note 26.
116
In Chinese, DACs are called caipan wenshu (裁判文书). DADs in China are
equivalent to court opinions in the United States.
117
This study uses the China Judgments Online search engine, which holds
one of the most comprehensive repositories of DADs online. ZHONGGUO CAIPAN
WENSHU WANG ( 中 国 裁 判 文 书 网 ) [CHINA JUDGMENTS ONLINE],
http://wenshu.court.gov.cn [https://perma.cc/V2R9-YTL9].
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between 2010 and 2018. No DADs prior to 2010 were generated
under the search.118 After data cleaning, the dataset contained 6,187
DADs. 119 To ensure the sample presents the same temporal and
regional structure of the population, the 6,187 cases were assigned
into different groups along with the year of the decision and the
province to where the court belongs. The identified DADs were
then systematically sampled. 120 A sample of 2,064 cases was
selected, which is approximately one-third of the population. Ten
DADs were dropped, as some were duplicates and some contained
incomplete information. The final number for the DADs analysis
was 2,054.121
After examining the DADs, a codebook was created with a list
of variables. Then, the information from the DADs was hand-coded
into a computer. Four independent coders were trained for content
analysis. 122 The average inter-coder reliability, measured by
Cohen’s Kappa, was 0.876789.
To supplement the quantitative study, the author collected data
from thirty-four informants who are all judges.123 Semi-structured
interviews were conducted with nine of the informants, all of whom
are experienced in adjudicating labor disputes. All thirty-four
informants 124 responded to a questionnaire on issues relating to
labor disputes in general and Serious Breach Dismissal Cases
specifically.125
118

online.

This is because most courts do not make their pre-2010 DADs available

In other words, the population is 6,187 DADs.
This study uses a systematic sampling method to obtain samples. First, we
numbered each case according to the year of the decision and the alphabetical order
of the province. For example, the first case of Anhui Province in 2010 was
numbered 00001, and the first case of Anhui Province in 2011 was numbered 10001.
Second, we obtained samples based on one third of the population. In other words,
we chose the first of every three cases. For example, the selected first and second
case in 2010 (in Anhui Province) was No.00001 and No.00004 respectively. 2064
samples were obtained for coding.
121
This study analyses 2054 DADs of Serious Breach Dismissal Cases. This
represents roughly one-third of the population.
122
In order to carry out high-reliability coding, this study trained the coders
and adjusted the codebooks based on the feedback from the coders. The training
of the coders lasted the entire month of November 2019. The formal coding started
on December 6, 2019, and was completed on January 31, 2020.
123
For details of the informants, see infra Appendix.
124
Out of the thirty-four questionnaire respondents, twenty-nine had
experience in handling labor disputes.
125
Questionnaire responses are on file with the author.
119
120
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b. How Does One Determine Winning and Losing?
There are three possible case outcomes in this study: “the
employee wins,” “both sides win partially,” 126 and “the employer
wins.”127
For cases with monetary claims only, “the employee wins” if the
employee is awarded the full amount claimed. “Both sides win
partially” if the employee recovered only a portion of the amount
claimed. “The employer wins” when no amount is awarded.
For cases with non-monetary claims only, there are two
situations: (a) request to continue the labor contract; or (b) request
to confirm that a labor relationship exists between employer and
employee during a certain period of time. For the first situation, “the
employee wins” if the court decides to continue the labor contract;
otherwise, “the employer wins.” For the second situation, “the
employee wins” if the court decides to confirm the labor
relationship; otherwise, “the employer wins.” For cases with nonmonetary claims only, there is no partial win for both sides.
There are some cases where the employee requests to either
continue the labor contract or seek monetary compensation. In these
cases, the employee is actually seeking to continue the labor contract
as the preferred remedy. As such, if the court rules in favor of
continuing the labor contract, the employee wins; if the court only
gives monetary compensation (regardless of the amount awarded),
it is a partial win for both sides. The employer wins if the court
neither continued the labor contract nor awarded monetary
compensation. It is important to note that requesting to continue the
labor contract and seeking compensation are mutually exclusive
claims, so it is not possible for both claims to be allowed by the court
simultaneously.
For hybrid claims (with both monetary and non-monetary
elements), the employee wins when the employee is awarded the
full amount claimed and the labor relationship is confirmed by the
court. Any of the following situations would be regarded as a
partial win for both sides: (1) employee recovered the full amount
of the monetary claim, but the labor relationship is not confirmed;
(2) employee only recovered a portion of the amount claimed and
the labor relationship is confirmed; (3) employee only recovered a
126

note 74.
127

This case outcome classification mirrors the classification in He & Su, supra
A “win” for the employer means a “loss” for the employee.
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portion of the amount claimed and the labor relationship is not
confirmed; or (4) employee is not awarded any monetary
compensation, but the court confirmed the labor relationship. For
hybrid claims, the employer wins if no monetary amount is awarded
and the court did not confirm the labor relationship.
c. Introduction to the Variables
This study coded a number of independent variables about the
employee that are likely to directly or indirectly affect the outcome
of the case.128 For instance, the gender of the employee was coded
to assess whether gender played a role in the outcome of the case.129
The average earned income of the employee was coded to test
whether financial resources of the employee affected the chance of
winning. The study also coded a number of independent variables
about the employer.130 The capacity of the employer can be critical
in determining outcome. As shown in He and Su’s Study,
government agencies and government-related firms commanded an
overwhelming advantage against all other entities.131 The location
of the parties vis-à-vis the location of the court was also recorded to
assess whether there is pattern of local protectionism.
Besides the basic information of the two parties, the contents of
the internal regulations that employees allegedly violated, and how
the employees allegedly violated them were also recorded (in other
words, the reasons for dismissal are recorded).132 Whether the court
128
Variables about the employee include, for instance, the employee’s gender,
average earned income and location of household registration (whether the same
location as the court or at a different location). It also included whether the
employee was represented and the type of legal representation.
129
An empirical study showed that gender has an impact on the outcomes of
divorce cases in Chinese courts. XIN HE, DIVORCE IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRAINTS AND GENDERED OUTCOMES (2021).
130
Variables about the employer include, for instance, the employer’s capacity
(e.g., whether it was a state-owned enterprise or a private firm), location, and legal
representation.
131
He & Su, supra note 74, at 132.
132
Variables on the principal reason for dismissal include, absence without
justification (旷工), extra-long sick leave (超长病假), extra-long special leave (超长
事假), refusing adjustment of position (调岗不到岗), refusal to adjust salary (拒绝调
薪), refusal to enter into a new employment contract (拒绝签订新的劳动合同),
unprofessional behavior (违规专业行为), violation of security regulations (such as
smoking, quarrelling, fighting in the workplace or threatening a co-worker) (违规
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conducted a “fairness review” was recorded (i.e., whether the court
conducted a substantive review of the fairness of the dismissal).133
Variables relating to procedural fairness were coded.134 The study
also coded whether there are any local regulations that provide
special safeguards for the employee litigants. Some independent
variables were set on the claim itself.135 The outcome of the case was
coded.136 A key variable of party capability—legal representation—
has also been coded. 137 Temporal and regional variations are
recorded to assess the variations in local judicial policies (and local
economic development) on labor disputes and changes in the
litigation of labor disputes through time.
V. FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS: EMPLOYERS CAME OUT AHEAD
a. Overview
i.

Temporal Variations

As part of an overview of the data, the temporal variations in
case outcome are presented in Table 1. 2016 had the highest rate of
frequency, and 2010 had the lowest rate of frequency. Using the
安全行为，如抽烟、争吵、打架、恐吓同事等), violation of diligent duty (such as
sleeping during working hours) ( 怠 工 ， 如 值班 睡 觉 等 ), and refusal to accept
arrangement for occupational injury (拒绝针对工伤的安排).
133
The substantive review of fairness of the dismissal focuses on the
reasonableness of the dismissal, i.e., whether the employers’ internal regulations
that employees violated were reasonable, as well as whether the employees’
behavior had seriously breached those regulations (as opposed to only technically
breaching the regulations).
134
The procedural fairness of the dismissal focuses on whether the procedure
of dismissal was fair or unfair, i.e., whether the employer has informed the labor
union before the dismissal; whether employer has given the employee a chance to
be heard before the dismissal; and whether the employer provided a procedure for
dismissal complaints.
135
Variables about the claim include the main claim of the employee
(monetary, non-monetary, or hybrid), whether the employee claimed double
financial compensation, and the value of the monetary claim.
136
Variables on the outcome of the case include the monetary amount
awarded to the employee, and whether the court found any illegality in the
dismissal or in the employer’s internal regulations. Whether the court awarded
double financial compensation was also recorded.
137
Galanter, supra note 95, at 114 ("Parties who have lawyers do better.").
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employer’s winning rates 138 as the reference point, the employees
performed the poorest in 2013 but improved from 2014 to 2017. The
improvement coincided with the explosion of cases in the same
period (2014-2017).
Table 1: Case Outcome by Year of Court Decision (N=2054)
Year of
Decisions1

Frequency

Employee
Wins

2018
2017
2016
2015
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
Total

14.36%
19.57%
21.71%
18.31%
13.97%
7.25%
2.04%
1.66%
1.12%
100%

17.29%
20.40%
11.66%
14.63%
16.38%
8.05%
2.38%
14.71%
8.70%
14.95%

1 Chi-square=43.880,

ii.

Both
Sides Win
Partially
18.64%
19.40%
19.28%
21.54%
13.24%
12.08%
23.81%
8.82%
17.39%
18.16%

Employer
Wins
64.07%
60.20%
69.06%
63.83%
70.38%
79.87%
73.81%
76.47%
73.91%
66.89%

DF=16, P<0.001.

Regional Variations

Studying the regional variations of case outcomes in Table 2
could unveil striking patterns. Courts in different regions may
adopt divergent adjudication policies. Economic divergences (here
focusing on GDP per capita)139 may also affect the outcome of these
cases. For instance, some regions may be more pro-employer than
others due to economic development needs. During the period
between 2010 and 2018, Guangdong had the highest rate of
frequency of cases, while Qinghai has the lowest rate of frequency.
Interestingly, the wealthiest province (Guangdong) and second
The employer’s win rate is the employee’s loss rate.
This study adopted the official GDP per capita data of provinces up to 2016.
See
National
Data,
NAT’L
BUREAU
STAT.,
http://data.stats.gov.cn/easyquery.htm?cn=E0103
[https://perma.cc/95LXPDJC].
138

139
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wealthiest province (Jiangsu) (in terms of GDP per capita) also have
the highest and second highest rate of frequency respectively.
Employees lost the most in Shanghai, China’s leading business
center. The predominance of business in the city may have
influenced courts, making Shanghai courts the most anti-labor in all
of China. Employees lost the least in Qinghai, but the rate of
frequency is also the lowest there.
Table 2: Case Outcome Across Provinces (N=2054)
Province1

GDP/Capita
(Unit RMB)
Guangdong
(97277.77)
Jiangsu
(92595.40)
Shandong
(76469.67)
Zhejiang
(56197.15)
Henan
(48055.86)
Sichuan
(40678.13)
Hubei
(39366.55)
Hunan
(36425.78)
Hebei
(36010.27)
Fujian
(35804.04)
Shanghai
(32679.87)

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

Frequency Employee
Wins

Both
Sides Win
Partially

Employer
Wins

13.00%

16.48%

12.73%

70.79%

10.66%

13.70%

22.37%

63.93%

4.72%

20.62%

19.59%

59.79%

5.26%

17.59%

15.74%

66.67%

3.55%

12.33%

19.18%

68.49%

6.38%

6.11%

18.32%

75.57%

3.21%

27.27%

18.18%

54.55%

3.80%

12.82%

16.67%

70.51%

2.87%

13.56%

23.73%

62.71%

2.68%

7.27%

21.82%

70.91%

8.03%

8.48%

5.45%

86.06%

316
Beijing
(30319.98)
Anhui
(30006.82)
Liaoning
(25315.35)
Shaanxi
(24438.32)
Jiangxi
(21984.78)
Chongqing
(20363.19)
Guangxi
(20352.51)
Tianjin
(18809.64)
Yunnan
(17881.12)
Inner
Mongolia
(17289.22)
Shanxi
(16818.11)
Heilongjiang
(16361.62)
Jilin
(15074.62)
Guizhou
(14806.45)
Xinjiang
(12199.08)
Gansu
(8246.07)
Hainan
(4832.05)
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3.55%

19.18%

26.03%

54.79%

3.55%

15.07%

23.29%

61.64%

5.89%

10.74%

16.53%

72.73%

1.56%

18.75%

28.12%

53.12%

1.07%

13.64%

36.36%

50%

4.04%

12.05%

21.69%

66.27%

2.68%

20%

21.82%

58.18%

2.78%

19.30%

17.54%

63.16%

0.93%

10.53%

21.05%

68.42%

0.63%

53.85%

15.38%

30.77%

0.63%

23.08%

0%

76.92%

1.56%

25.00%

9.38%

65.62%

2.73%

16.07%

16.07%

67.86%

0.97%

25.00%

50%

25.00%

0.88%

16.67%

11.11%

72.22%

0.58%

25.00%

25.00%

50%

1.27%

7.69%

23.08%

69.23%
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Ningxia
(3705.18)
Qinghai
(2865.23)

0.39%

12.50%

25.00%

62.50%

0.15%

33.33%

66.67%

0%

1 Chi-square=132.917,

iii.

DF=58, P<0.001.

Economic Factors: Employees’ Success Rates Across Five
GDP Per Capita Clusters

To measure the variation across provinces of similar economic
strength in terms of GDP per capita,140 the provinces are assigned
into five different “GDP Per Capita Clusters.”141 From the data in
Table 3, the “middle income” cluster (GDP Per Capita Cluster (RMB
40000–60000)) seems to be least favorable to employees (i.e.,
employees are losing the most). Interestingly, employees performed
comparatively well in the “poorest” cluster (GDP Per Capita Cluster
(RMB 0-20000)). This could be an indication that courts in least
developed regions in China are less pro-employer than most courts
in more affluent regions. The cluster with the highest rate of
frequency is GDP Per Capita Cluster (RMB 20000-40000).
The employee litigant’s success rates varied significantly across
the different GDP Per Capita Clusters (Chi-square=132.917,
P<0.001).

For an explanation about the data source, see supra note 139.
The five clusters are: (a) below RMB 20000; (b) not less than RMB20000, but
less than RMB40000 per capita; (c) not less than RMB40000, but less than RMB60000
per capita; (d) not less than RMB60000, but less than RMB80000 per capita; and (e)
not less than RMB80000, but less than RMB100000 per capita.
140

141
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Table 3: Case Outcome by GDP Per Capita Clusters (N=2054)
GDP Per
Capita1
(Unit: RMB
1000)
[80,100)
[60,80)
[40,60)
[20,40)
[0, 20)
1

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Both
Sides Win
Partially

Employer
Wins

23.66%
4.72%
15.19%
42.94%
13.49%

15.23%
20.62%
11.54%
13.83%
19.86%

17.08%
19.59%
17.63%
18.48%
19.13%

67.70%
59.79%
70.83%
67.69%
61.01%

Chi-square=132.917, DF=58, P<0.001.

b. The Employers Came Out Ahead
i.

Employers are Winning by a Substantial Margin

The data in Table 4 shows (n=2054) that the employers have
come out ahead by a substantial margin. The employers’ winning
rate is 66.89% while the employee’s winning rate is only 14.95%.
This is a whooping difference of 51.94% in terms of winning rate
comparison. The partial wining rate for both sides is 18.16%. These
findings contradict the established perception that Chinese courts
are pro-labor.
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Table 4: General Information on Case Outcome (N=2054) and
Employees’ Recovery Rate in Monetary Claims (N=1848)
Outcome

Frequency

%

Cumulative
Rate of
Percent

Frequency

%

14.95%

Employees’
Recovery
Rate in
Monetary
Claims
>100%

Employee
Wins
Both
Sides Win
Partially
Employer
Wins
Total

307

14.95

6

0.32

373

18.16

33.11%

100%

214

11.58

1374

66.89

100%

122

6.60

2054

100

(75%,
100%)
(50%, 75%]
(25%, 50%]
(0%, 25%]
0%
Total

96
80
64
1266
1848

5.19
4.33
3.46
68.51
100

ii.

Monetary Claims: Recovery Rate, Average Claim,
and Average Award

The recovery rates for employees on monetary claims in Table 4
tell the same story (n=1848): an overwhelming victory for
employers. 142 The employee recovered nothing 68.51% of the
time. 143 The employee achieved full recovery only 11.58% of the
time.144 Statistics in Table 5 show for the data (n=1848) that the mean
and median values of the average monetary claim are RMB65461.84
and RMB35297.19, respectively, with standard deviation at
RMB219013.66. The data shows that the mean and median values of
the average monetary award are RMB12096.85 and RMB0.00,
respectively, with standard deviation at RMB35563.93. The data
shows that the mean and median values of the recovery rates of

See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
144
In rare cases (0.32%), the court awarded more than 100% of the monetary
claim (the highest recovery rate was 133% of the monetary claim). Supra Table 4.
142
143
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monetary claims are 0.23 and 0.00, respectively, with standard
deviation at 0.38.
Table 5: Statistics on Monetary Claims and Monetary Awards of
Employees (N=1848)

Average Monetary Claim
Average Monetary
Award
Recover Rate

Mean
65461.84
12096.85

Median
35297.19
0.00

SD
219013.66
35563.93

0.23

0.00

0.38

c. Capacity of the Employee
i.

Employee as Plaintiff or Defendant

Labor disputes reach the courts only after labor dispute
arbitration.145 If the employee wins in the arbitration, the employer
will take the matter to court as the “plaintiff” (effectively appealing
the arbitration decision), in which case the employee will be the
“defendant.” If the employer wins in the arbitration, the employee
will become the “plaintiff” in the court litigation.146 From the data
(n=2054) in Table 6, employees lost more as plaintiffs (76.78%) and
less as defendants (38.56%). This indicates something important: if
the employee had already won in the arbitration, the court is more
reluctant to find against the employee. By contrast, if the employee
had lost in the arbitration, the court is very likely to uphold the
arbitration decision and find against the employee. This shows that
the outcome of the labor dispute arbitration has a direct bearing on
the decision of the court.
The data shows that employees’ success rate varied significantly
by whether they were plaintiffs or defendants (Chi-square=387.656,
DF=4, P<0.001).
145
Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa ( 劳 动 争 议 调 解 仲 裁 法 ) [Labor
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law], art. 5; see also Zhao, supra note 40, at 416
(“[A] dispute can only come before the people's court if one party does not accept
the arbitral award.”).
146
In rare cases, the employee could be a plaintiff in one case and a defendant
in another.
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Table 6: Case Outcome by Employee Being Plaintiff/Defendant in
Litigation (N=2054)

1

Employee’s
Identity1

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Plaintiff
Defendant
Plaintiff and
Defendant

73.37%
23.61%
3.02%

6.90%
40.62%
9.68%

Both
Sides Win
Partially
16.32%
20.82%
41.94%

Employer
Wins
76.78%
38.56%
48.39%

Chi-square=387.656, DF=4, P<0.001.

ii.

Location of the Employee

The data (n=1196) in Table 7 shows that the employee loses
more 147 if the location of their household registration is different
from the location of the court hearing the case. This may indicate
that the local courts are less protective of employees who are
“outsiders” or migrant workers in labor disputes.
The data shows that employees’ success rate varied significantly
by the location of the employees (Chi-square=13.060, DF=2, P<0.01).
Table 7: Case Outcome by the Employee’s Location (N=1196)
Employee’s
Location1

Frequency

Employee
Wins
16.09%

Both
Sides Win
Partially
19.67%

The Same as
the Location
of the Court
Different
from the
Location of
the Court

81.61%

18.39%

Employer
Wins
64.24%

14.55%

10%

75.45%

147
The employers’ success rate is higher when the employees’ location of their
household registration is different from the location of the court.
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Chi-square=13.060, DF=2, P<0.01.

iii.

Gender of the Employee

While the data (n=1452) in Table 8 shows that male employees
lose more than female employees, the case outcome did not vary
significantly by gender (Chi-square=5.920, DF=4, P=0.205).148
Table 8: Case Outcome by the Gender of Employee (N=1452)

1

Gender of
Employee1

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Female
Male
Female and
Male

34.20%
86.87%
0.33%

16.63%
15.40%
0%

Both Sides
Win
Partially
22.25%
17.61%
25.00%

Employer
Wins
61.12%
66.99%
75.00%

Chi-square=5.920, DF=4, P=0.205.

iv.

Single and Multiple Employee Litigants

From the data (n=2054) in Table 9, single employee litigants lose
more (67.06%) than multiple employee litigants (47.06%).
Employees’ success rate varied significantly by the number of
employee litigants (single or multiple) (Chi-square=22.811, DF=12,
P<0.05), but note the very low rate of frequency for multiple
employee litigants (0.83%).
Table 9: Case Outcome by Single or Multiple Employee Litigant(s)
(N=2054)
Single or
Multiple1

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Both
Sides Win
Partially

Employer
Wins

148
For multiple employee litigants, the gender of the first employee litigant is
taken for this analysis.
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99.17%
0.83%

14.78%
35.29%

18.16%
17.65%

67.06%
47.06%

Chi-square=22.811, DF=12, P<0.05.

v.

Employees’ Average Earned Income

From the data (n=1433) in Table 10, no particular pattern is
identified in the variation of outcome by the average earned income
of the employees. From the data, most employee litigants are within
the bracket of lowest-income wage earners (with 76.20% in the RMB
0-5000 bracket). This data informs us that labor dispute resolution
in Chinese courts, at least as far as serious breach dismissals are
concerned, involve significant power asymmetry between the
parties. Having said that, the lowest-income bracket of employee
litigants is not losing the most (58.88%) when compared to
employees from other income brackets (one income bracket of
litigants have lost 100% of the time (the RMB 35000-40000 bracket)).
The case outcome varied significantly by the average earned
income of the employees (Chi-square=2121.950, DF=1966, P<0.01).
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Table 10: Case Outcome by Employees’ Average Earned Income
(N=1433)
Average
Earned
Income
(RMB)1
(50000,
(45000,
50000]
(40000,
45000]
(35000,
40000]
(30000,
35000]
(25000,
30000]
(20000,
25000]
(15000,
20000]
(10000,
15000]
(5000,
10000]
(0, 5000]
1

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Both Sides
Win
Partially

Employer
Wins

0.28%
0.14%

50%
0%

0%
50%

50%
50%

0.28%

25.00%

50%

25.00%

0.21%

0%

0%

100%

0.42%

33.33%

33.33%

33.33%

0.56%

50%

0%

50%

0.42%

16.67%

33.33%

50%

1.12%

12.50%

12.50%

75.00%

3.21%

15.22%

23.91%

60.87%

17.17%

16.67%

20.73%

62.60%

76.20%

16.85%

24.27%

58.88%

Chi-square=2121.950, DF=1966, P<0.01.

d. Capacity of the Employer
i.

Employer’s Location

The employer wins more when it is in the same location as the
court than when it is in a different location from the court, but the
margin is too slight to assess whether that there was local
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protectionism in the adjudication.149 The employer’s location vis-àvis the location of the court that hears the case was insignificant in
the variation of the outcome of the case (Chi-square=0.701, DF=2,
P=0.704).150
Table 11: Case Outcome by the Employer’s Location (N=2023)

1

Employer’s
Location1

Frequency

Employee
Wins
15.05%

Both
Sides Win
Partially
18.11%

Same as the
Location of
the Court
Different
from the
Location of
the Court

98.52%

1.48%

Employer
Wins
66.83%

16.67%

23.33%

60%

Chi-square=0.701, DF=2, P=0.704.

ii.

Employer’s Capacity

The data (n=2054) in Table 12 seems to suggest that courts are
most favorable toward government employees, and least favorable
to employees of foreign firms, as employees have lost the least when
pitted against state organs and institutions (58.54%) and have lost
the most when they are litigating against foreign firms (79.08%) and
their local subsidiaries (79.21%). Employees of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) fare better (they lose 69.09% of the time) than
employees of listed firms (private)151 (they lose 72.92% of the time),
but do worse than employees from non-listed private firms (they
lose 63.14% of the time). The employer’s capacity was significant in
the variation of the outcome of the case (Chi-square=48.796, DF= 16,
P<0.001).
See infra Table 11.
See infra Table 11.
151
”Listed firms (private)” here means that they are listed corporations that
are non-SOEs. It does not carry the meaning of private company under the
dichotomy of private/public companies.
149

150
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Table 12: Case Outcome by the Employer’s Capacity (N=2054)

1

Employer’s
Capacity1

Frequency

Employee
Wins
20.73%

Both
Sides Win
Partially
20.73%

State Organs
and
Institutions
State-Owned
Enterprises
(SOEs)
Non-Listed
Private Firm
Listed Firm
(Private)
Foreign Firm
Non-listed
Subsidiary
of Listed
Firm
Local
Subsidiary
of Foreign
Firm
Others

3.99%

Employer
Wins
58.54%

5.36%

14.55%

16.36%

69.09%

60.76%

16.51%

20.35%

63.14%

2.34%

14.58%

12.50%

72.92%

15.82%
2.39%

10.46%
12.24%

10.46%
16.33%

79.08%
71.43%

4.92%

7.92%

12.87%

79.21%

4.43%

14.29%

25.27%

60.44%

Chi-square=48.796, DF= 16, P<0.001.

e. Legal Representation
i.

Type of Legal Representation of the Employee

The employer’s type of legal representation was significant in
the variation of the outcome of the case in Table 13 (Chisquare=24.558, DF = 14, P<0.05). From the data (n=2054), the “losing
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rate” of the employee without legal representation 152 (64.68%) is
slightly lower than the employees’ “general losing rate”153 (66.89%).
An unrepresented employee loses less (loses 64.68% of the time)
than an employee represented by a professional attorney from a law
firm (loses 68.69% of the time), a professional attorney from the
government (loses 100% of the time), staff from legal
organizations 154 (losing rate of 100%) and “others” (losing rate of
69.68%). An unrepresented employee loses more than an employee
represented by a relative or friend (losing rate of 60.42%), basic-level
legal service (losing rate of 63.58%) and multiple legal counsel
(losing rate of 41.38%).

152
The “losing rate” of the employee when the employee had no legal
representation means the “winning rate of the employer” when the employee had
no legal representation.
153
The “general losing rate” of the employee means the general winning rate
of the employer in this study.
154
“Staff from legal organizations” is jiedao falu gongzuoweiyuanhui
gongzuorenyuan (街道法律工作委员会工作人员) in Chinese.
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Table 13: Case Outcome by the Type of Legal Representation of the
Employee (N=2054)
Employee’s
Legal Rep. 1

Frequency

Employee
Wins

No Legal
Representative
Relative or
Friend
Staff from
Legal
Organization
Professional
Attorney from
Law Firm
Professional
Attorney from
Government
Basic-level
Legal Service
Multiple Legal
Counsel
Others

23.71%

1Chi-square=24.558,

ii.

18.28%

Both Sides
Win
Partially
17.04%

Employer
Wins
64.68%

2.34%

20.83%

18.75%

60.42%

0.15%

0%

0%

100%

56.28%

13.15%

18.17%

68.69%

0.15%

0%

0%

100%

8.42%

18.50%

17.92%

63.58%

1.41%

20.69%

37.93%

41.38%

7.55%

11.61%

18.71%

69.68%

DF = 14, P<0.05.

Type of Legal Representation of the Employer

The data (n=2054) in Table 14 shows an unrepresented employer
wins less than an employer with any type of representation.
However, the employer’s type of legal representation was
insignificant in the variation of the outcome of the case (Chisquare=14.993, DF=12, P=0.242).
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Table 14: Case Outcome by the Type of Legal Representation of the
Employer (N=2054)
Employer’s
Legal Rep. 1
No Legal
Representative
Staff from
Firm
Staff from
Legal
Organization
Professional
Attorney from
Law Firm
Basic-level
Legal Service
Workers
Multiple Legal
Counsel
Others
1

Frequency Employee Both Sides
Wins
Win
Partially
1.17%
16.67%
37.50%

45.83%

21.23%

15.37%

17.89%

66.74%

0.15%

0%

0%

100%

48.00%

16.33%

18.26%

65.42%

1.31%

7.41%

22.22%

70.37%

19.23%

13.42%

16.71%

69.87%

8.91%

10.93%

18.58%

70.49%

Employer
Wins

Chi-square=14.993, DF=12, P=0.242.

iii.

Legal Representation of Each Party

From the data (n=2054) in Table 15, almost all employers were
represented (with a rate of frequency of 98.83%), as compared to the
lower rate of representation for employees (only 76.29%). When the
employee was unrepresented, the employee actually loses less.
When the employer was represented, the employer wins more.
Whether the employee was represented was insignificant in the
variation of the outcome of the case (Chi-square=5.638, DF = 2, P =
0.060). Whether the employer was represented was significant in
the variation of the outcome of the case (Chi-square=6.660, DF = 2,
P < 0.05).
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Table 15: Case Outcome by Legal Representation of Each Party
(N=2054)
Legal
Representation

Employer
Wins

Employee1

67.58%
64.68%
67.14%
45.83%

Employer2
1
2

Frequency Employee Both
Wins
Sides
Win
Partially
Yes 76.29%
13.91%
18.51%
No 23.71%
18.28%
17.04%
Yes 98.83%
14.93%
17.93%
No 1.17%
16.67%
37.50%

Chi-square=5.638, DF = 2, P = 0.060.
Chi-square=6.660, DF = 2, P < 0.05.

iv.

Legal Representation of Employee (LRE) vs. Legal
Representation of Employer (LRR)

From the data (n=2054) in Table 16, when the employee is
represented, the employee loses more when the employer is also
represented (employee loses 67.84% of the time), as compared to
when the employer is unrepresented (employee loses 33.33% of the
time). This was significant in the variation of the outcome of the case
(Chi-square=6.672, DF = 2, P < 0.05).
When the employee is unrepresented, the employee also loses
more when the employer is represented (employee loses 64.84% of
the time), as compared to when the employer is unrepresented
(employee loses 58.33% of the time).
However, this was
insignificant in the variation of the outcome of the case (Chisquare=2.658, DF = 2, P = 0.256).
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Table 16: Case Outcome by Legal Representation of Employee (LRE) vs.
Legal Representation of Employer (LRR) (N=2054)
LRE = No1
LRR =
Yes

LRR=
No

Total

LRR =
Yes

LRR =
No

Employee 18.53%
Wins

8.33%

18.28%

13.83%

25.00% 13.91%

16.63% 33.33% 17.04%

18.33%

41.67% 18.51%

Employer 64.84% 58.33% 64.68%
Wins

67.84%

33.33% 67.58%

Outcome

Both
Sides
Win
Partially

Total
N
1
2

LRE = Yes2
Total

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

100%

475

12

487

1555

12

1567

Chi-square=2.658, DF = 2, P = 0.256.
Chi-square=6.672, DF = 2, P < 0.05.

f.

Details of the Dismissal and the Employee’s Claim
i.

Principal Reason for Dismissal

From the data (n=2054) in Table 17, the employee loses the most
when the principal reason for dismissal was strike (employee loses
91.67% of the time). The employee loses the least (employee loses
0.00% of the time) when the principal reason for dismissal was
refusal to enter into a new labor contract. The principal reason for
dismissal was significant in the variation of the outcome of the case
(Chi-square=79.184, DF = 24, P<0.001). From the data, it appears
that courts are inherently hostile toward organized labor and strikes.
This is strong evidence contradicting the established view that
Chinese courts are pro-labor.
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Table 17: Case Outcome by the Principal Reason for Dismissal
(N=2054)
Principal
Reason for
Dismissal1
Absence
Without
Justification
Extra-Long
Sick Leave
Extra-Long
Special Leave
Refusing
Adjustment of
Position
Refusing to
Enter into a
New Labor
Contract
Irregular
Professional
Behavior
Behavior That
Violates
Security
Violation of
Diligent Duty
Receiving
Kickback
Commission
of Crime
Strike
Disobeying
Work
Arrangements

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol43/iss2/1

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Both
Sides Win
Partially

Employer
Wins

40.51%

12.02%

15.26%

72.72%

0.34%

0%

28.57%

71.43%

0.15%

33.33%

33.33%

33.33%

3.12%

17.19%

26.56%

56.25%

0.24%

20%

80%

0%

14.17%

18.21%

18.90%

62.89%

12.51%

14.79%

21.79%

63.42%

9.01%

15.14%

14.59%

70.27%

1.56%

18.75%

9.38%

71.88%

1.95%

7.50%

15.00%

77.50%

1.17%
4.19%

4.17%
19.77%

4.17%
12.79%

91.67%
67.44%

2022]

11.10%

Others
1
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21.05%

27.63%

51.32%

Chi-square=79.184, DF = 24, P<0.001.

ii.

Employee’s Principal Claim

From the data (n=2054) in Table 18, the vast majority of
employees sought financial compensation (frequency rate of
88.61%). Only a very small fraction sought to terminate the labor
contract (frequency rate of 0.05%). The employee has varying
success with different principal claims. For instance, the employee
loses more when he seeks to continue the labor contract (employee
loses 65.36% of the time) when compared to the employee seeking
to confirm the employment relationship (employee loses 57.41% of
the time). The principal claim was significant in the variation of the
outcome of the case (Chi-square=68.544, DF = 6, P < 0.01).
Table 18: Case Outcome by Employee’s Principal Claim (N=2054)
Principal
Claim1

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Compensation
Continuation
of the labor
Contract
Confirmation
of the
Employment
Relationship
Termination
of the Labor
Contract

88.61%
8.71%

13.35%
31.28%

Both
Employer
Sides Win Wins
Partially
19.29%
67.36%
3.35%
65.36%

2.63%

12.96%

29.63%

57.41%

0.05%

100%

0%

0%

1 Chi-square=68.544,
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iii.

Double Financial Compensation?

Under the law, employees who are wrongfully dismissed are
automatically entitled to double financial compensation. 155
However, in practice, the courts will not consider awarding double
financial compensation unless specifically pleaded. From the data
(n=2054) in Table 19, only 30.92% of employees claimed double
financial compensation. And when they do, their success rate is
higher than when they do not claim double financial compensation.
One possible explanation is that employees will only claim double
financial compensation when their case is strong. As their case is
already strong, the chances of winning are also greater. Whether the
employee claimed double financial compensation was significant in
the variation of the outcome of the case (Chi-square=43.928, DF = 2,
P < 0.001).
Table 19: Case Outcome by Whether Employee Claimed Double Financial
Compensation (N=2054)
Double
Financial1
Compensation
Yes
No
1 Chi-square=43.928,

iv.

Frequency

Employee
Wins

30.92%
69.08%

18.74%
13.25%

Both
Sides Win
Partially
24.57%
15.29%

Employer
Wins
56.69%
71.46%

DF = 2, P < 0.001.

Type of Employee’s Non-Monetary Claim

From the data (n=2054) in Table 20, 49.51% of all cases are pure
monetary claims. For all other cases, there is a non-monetary
element in the claims. Among these cases, the employee loses the
least when he sought to confirm the employment relationship
(employee loses 49.37% of the time); the employee loses the most
when the claim was for the employer to bear the legal costs
(employee loses 79.81% of the time).

155

Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 87.
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The type of the employee’s non-monetary claim was significant
in the variation of the outcome of the case (Chi-square=136.600, DF
= 14, P < 0.001).
Table 20: Case Outcome by the Type of Employee’s Non-Monetary Claim
(N=2054)
Type of NonMonetary
Claim1
Continuation
of the Labor
Contract
Termination
of the Labor
Contract
Confirmation
of the
Employment
Relationship
Social
Insurance
Employer to
Bear Legal
Costs
Confirmation
of Illegal
Termination
of Labor
Contract by
Employer
Other NonMonetary
Relief
No NonMonetary
Element (i.e.,

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

Frequency

Employee
Wins

9.25%

33.68%

Both Sides Employer
Win
Wins
Partially
3.16%
63.16%

5.36%

12.73%

20%

67.27%

3.85%

12.66%

37.97%

49.37%

7.50%

14.29%

29.87%

55.84%

15.68%

7.45%

12.73%

79.81%

4.77%

10.20%

19.39%

70.41%

4.09%

14.29%

27.38%

58.33%

49.51%

14.85%

18.29%

66.86%
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Pure
Monetary
Claim)
1 Chi-square=136.600,

v.

DF = 14, P < 0.001.

Whether Employer Notified Labor Union Before the
Dismissal

Under the SPC 2013 Interpretation, if the employer dismisses an
employee but failed to notify the relevant labor union,156 the court
must award compensation to the employee.157 The intention of this
interpretation was to provide some procedural safeguard to
employees in the dismissal process. However, the reality is quite
different. From the data (n=2054) in Table 21, most employers did
not notify the relevant labor union before dismissing the employee
(frequency rate of 68.89%).
According to the SPC 2013
Interpretation, if the employer fails to notify the labor union before
dismissal, the court should automatically rule in favor of the
employee. 158 However, the court has ruled against the employee
59.72% of the time. This is a direct contradiction of the SPC 2013
Interpretation. When the employer did notify the labor union, the
employee loses more. 159 Interestingly, the employee loses more
when the labor union objected to the dismissal (employee loses
100% of the time) than when the labor union supported the dismissal
(employee loses 82.73% of the time). This anomaly is hard to
explain.
Whether the employer notified the labor union before the
dismissal was significant in the variation of the outcome of the case
(Chi-square=106.704, DF = 4, P < 0.001).

156
Labor unions in China are organized under the All China Federation of
Trade Unions.
157
Supra note 107.
158
See supra note 107
159
See infra Table 21.
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Table 21: Case Outcome by Whether the Employer Notified the Labor
Union Before the Dismissal (N=2054)
Notified
Labor Union
(“LU”)?1
No
Yes, and
Dismissal
Supported
by the LU
Yes, but the
LU Objected
to Dismissal

Frequency

Employee Both Sides
Wins
Win
Partially

Employer
Wins

68.89%
31.01%

17.88%
8.48%

22.40%
8.79%

59.72%
82.73%

0.10%

0%

0%

100%

1 Chi-square=106.704,

vi.

DF = 4, P < 0.001.

Whether the Employee Was Given an Opportunity to
be Heard Before Dismissal

In some local regulations (e.g., in Suzhou), if the employer failed
to give the employee an opportunity to be heard before dismissing
the employee for breach of the employer’s internal regulations, the
dismissal must be considered unfair (and therefore, unlawful). 160
This provides sound procedural safeguard in the dismissal process.
This, however, is not the position of the national law. Giving
employees an opportunity to be heard is not a statutory requirement
under the LCL. From the data (n=2054) in Table 22, employees were
denied the opportunity to be heard before dismissal in the vast
majority of cases (frequency rate of 97.52%). Only 2.48% of the time
were employees given the opportunity to heard before dismissal.
This shows that on the national level, the protection of procedural
rights of employees is extremely weak in China. Dismissal in China
remains a summary process. Where the employee was given an
opportunity to be heard, the employee loses more in court
(employee loses 82.35% of the time) as compared to the employee
who was not given a chance to be heard (employee loses 66.50% of
the time). One speculation is that the courts could be of the view
160

See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
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that if the employer had heard the employee’s side of the story, the
dismissal was somehow more “just.” However, whether the
employee was given an opportunity to be heard was insignificant in
the variation of the outcome of the case (Chi-square=5.645, DF = 2,
P = 0.059).
Table 22:14 Case Outcome by Whether the Employee Was Given an
Opportunity to be Heard Before Dismissal (N=2054)
Employee
Frequency
Given an
Opportunity
to be Heard?1
Yes
2.48%
No
97.52%
1 Chi-square=5.645,

vii.

Employee
Wins

Both
Sides Win
Partially

Employer
Wins

7.84%
15.13%

9.80%
18.37%

82.35%
66.50%

DF = 2, P = 0.059.

Whether a Warning Notice was Given to the Employee
Before Dismissal

Serving a warning notice on the employee before initiating
dismissal is part of due process. While not required by law, the data
in Table 23 shows (n=2054) that some employers do serve warning
notices on employees (frequency rate of 20.20%). Yet the majority of
employers do not serve warning notices on employees (frequency
rate of 79.80%). The employee loses more when served with a
warning notice prior to dismissal (employee loses 78.80% of the
time) when compared with the employee who received no warning
notice (employee loses 63.88% of the time). Whether a warning
notice was given to the employee before the dismissal was
significant in the variation of the outcome of the case (Chisquare=35.210, DF = 2, P < 0.001).
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Table 23: Case Outcome by Whether a Warning Notice was Provided to
the Employee Before Dismissal (N=2054)
Warning
Notice1

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Yes
No

20.20%
79.80%

11.33%
15.86%

1 Chi-square=35.210,

Both Sides
Win
Partially
9.88%
20.26%

Employer
Wins
78.80%
63.88%

DF = 2, P < 0.001.

g. Previous Dispute Resolution
i.

Previous Labor Dispute Arbitration Outcome

Labor dispute arbitration is the first instance forum for labor
dispute resolution in China. It would be interesting to see whether
its outcome has any bearing on the ensuing lawsuit in dismissal
cases. From the data (n=2054) in Table 24, the court has a tendency
to confirm the arbitration decision. When the arbitration outcome is
completely in favor of the employee, the employee loses the least in
the litigation (employee loses 35.14% of the time); when the
arbitration outcome is completely in favor of the employer, the
employee loses the most in the litigation (employee loses 86.59% of
the time); when the arbitration outcome is partially in favor of the
employee, the employee losing rate is in between the two (employee
loses 43.19% of the time). This shows that labor dispute arbitration
is a very important stage in the protection of the employee’s rights
that clearly has an impact on the outcome of the ensuing lawsuit.
Previous labor dispute arbitration outcome was significant in the
variation of the outcome of the case (Chi-square=683.419, DF = 6, P
< 0.001). 12.12% of the cases were rejected by labor dispute arbitral
tribunal on different grounds. These cases eventually reached the
court. The employees lose 59.44% of the time in this type of case.
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Table 24: Case Outcome by Previous Labor Dispute Arbitration Outcome
(N=2054)
Arbitration
Outcome

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Completely in
Favor of the
Employee
Partially in
Favor of the
Employee
Completely in
Favor of the
Employer
Case Rejected
by Labor
Arbitration
Tribunal

12.61%

1 Chi-square=683.419,

DF = 6, P < 0.001.

ii.

56.76%

Both
Sides Win
Partially
8.11%

Employer
Wins
35.14%

16.80%

17.39%

39.42%

43.19%

48.64%

4.00%

9.41%

86.59%

12.12%

10.84%

29.72%

59.44%

Previous Mediation Attempt?

If the parties attempted mediation prior to the lawsuit, would
that have a bearing on the litigation outcome? In China, parties are
asked to disclose previous mediation attempts to the court. From
the data (n=2054) in Table 25, the great majority of parties did not
attempt mediation prior to litigation (frequency rate of 94.89%).
When parties did not attempt mediation, the employee lost 67.11%
of the time. Only around 5% of the time did parties attempt
mediation. When parties attempted mediation, but failed to reach a
settlement, the employee lost 63.00% of the time. When parties
attempted mediation, successfully reached a settlement, but later
revoked the settlement and commenced litigation, the employee lost
60.00% of the time. A previous mediation attempt was insignificant
in the variation of the outcome of the case (Chi-square=2.835, DF =
4, P = 0.586).
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Table 25: Case Outcome by Previous Mediation Attempt (N=2054)
Previous
Mediation
Attempt1

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Yes,
Attempted
Mediation
but Without
a Settlement
Yes,
Attempted
Mediation
and with a
Settlement
No

4.87%

1 Chi-square=2.835,

17.00%

Both
Sides
Win
Partially
20%

Employer
Wins

63.00%

0.24%

0%

40%

60%

94.89%

14.88%

18.01%

67.11%

DF = 4, P = 0.586.

h. Substantive Review of the Legality and Fairness of the
Dismissal?
i.

Court Ruling of Legality of the Dismissal

From the data (n=2054) in Table 26, the court found the dismissal
was legal 69.96% of the time and illegal 28.53% of the time. Cases of
illegal dismissal usually concern the employer failing to notify the
labor union prior to dismissing the employee, which is in breach of
the law.161 When the court found that the dismissal was legal, the
employee lost 93.53% of the time. When the court found the
dismissal to be illegal, the employee lost 2.90% of the time. This
shows that the court’s finding of legality of the dismissal is crucial
to the outcome of the case: when the court finds the dismissal to be
161 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. Under the LCL, prior to the
dismissal, the employer must notify the relevant labor union of its decision to
dismiss the employee and the reasons for the dismissal. Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动
合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 43.
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legal, the employee almost never wins; when the court finds the
dismissal to be illegal, the employee almost never loses. However,
as will be shown below, the court reached this decision most of the
time by simply applying the plain meaning of Article 39(2) of the
LCL without deeper inquiry into the reasonableness of the internal
rules or the fairness of the dismissal. In other words, when
determining the question of legality, the court most of the time
simply stopped at the factual question of whether the internal
regulations of the employer were breached by the employee without
further qualitative inquiry into fairness.
The court ruling of legality of the dismissal was significant in the
variation of the outcome of the case (Chi-square=1592.832, DF = 4, P
< 0.001).
Table 26: Case Outcome by Court Ruling of Legality of the Dismissal
(N=2054)
Dismissal
Legal?

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Yes
No
No
Information or
Insufficient
Information to
Decide

69.96%
28.53%
1.51%

1.18%
49.15%
6.45%

1 Chi-square=1592.832,

ii.

Both
Sides Win
Partially
5.29%
47.95%
51.61%

Employer
Wins
93.53%
2.90%
41.94%

DF = 4, P < 0.001.

Court Ruling of Legality of the Relevant Internal
Regulations of the Employer Company

Internal regulations could be ruled as “illegal” for a number of
reasons. The most common ground is that the internal regulations
were adopted without proper endorsement by the decision-making
body of the employer company (either the board or general
meeting). The other reason is the failure to publicly notify (gongshi)
the employee about the contents of the internal regulations (the
public notification requirement). While the court ruled the dismissal
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illegal 28.53% of the time, 162 the court only found the relevant
internal regulations of the employer were illegal 2.73% of the time,
as shown in Table 27. This shows that most cases of illegal
dismissals were unrelated to the legality of internal regulations.
However, the court ruling of legality of internal regulations was
significant in the variation of the outcome of the case (Chisquare=105.773, DF = 2, P < 0.001).
Table 27: Case Outcome by Court Ruling of Legality of the Relevant
Internal Regulations of the Employer Company (N=2054)
Internal
Regulations
Illegal?
Yes
No

Frequency

Employee
Wins

2.73%
97.27%

48.21%
14.01%

1 Chi-square=105.773,

iii.

Both
Sides Win
Partially
48.21%
17.32%

Employer
Wins
3.57%
68.67%

DF = 2, P < 0.001.

Whether the Court Conducted a “Fairness Review”
(a Substantive Review of the Dismissal to Determine
Its Fairness)

The data in Table 28a shows (n=2054) that courts in most cases
(68.26% of the time) did not conduct a fairness review (substantive
review of the dismissal to determine its fairness). This implies that
the courts in these cases simply looked at the facts to determine if
the employees seriously breached the employer company’s internal
regulations. The courts in these cases did not consider whether the
dismissals were fair or unfair. This is immensely troubling as
employees are completely unprotected from unfair dismissal in
these cases. For instance, the internal regulations could be so
unreasonable that breaching the regulations should not justify
dismissal. Justice cannot be served if breaching the internal
regulations was the only factor the court considered in reaching its
decision. This is particularly unsatisfactory as courts are required to
conduct a fairness review under the law. Under the SPC 2008
Interpretation,163 if the employer is “really wrong” in dismissing the
162
163

See supra Table 26.
See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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employee, the court can revoke the dismissal. This confers
substantive review powers, as well as an obligation on the court to
assess whether the dismissal was unfair. The court’s failure to
conduct a fairness review is, therefore, a contravention of the law.
From Table 28a, when no fairness review is conducted, the
employer wins 89.59% of the time. When the court does conduct a
fairness review, the employer prevails only 18.10% of the time. This
stark contrast shows the critical impact of the fairness review on case
outcomes. Whether the court conducted a substantive review of the
dismissal to determine its fairness was significant in the variation of
the outcome of the case (Chi-square=1044.008, DF=2, P<0.000).
As seen in Table 28b, when the court does conduct a fairness
review (frequency rate of 31.74%), the court almost always finds for
the employee when the dismissal was unfair164 and almost always
finds for the employer when the dismissal was fair. 165 The only
exception is when the court found that both the internal regulations
were unreasonable and the breach was not serious (the employee’s
losing rate is as high as 20%). But given the very low rate of
frequency (0.24%), this seems to be an outlier rather than the norm.
When the breach was not serious, the losing rate of the employee
was as low as 0.81%. This shows that the employee almost always
prevails if the breach is technical, as long as the court conducts a
fairness review.

164
When the court found the internal regulations were unreasonable (after
conducting a fairness review), the losing rate of the employee was 2.78%; when the
breach was not serious, the losing rate of the employee was as low as 0.81%; and
when the court found the dismissal was unfair or illegal on other grounds, the
losing rate of the employee was 1.59%. Infra Table 28b.
165
The losing rate of the employee was as high as 98.20% when the court
found that the dismissal was fair after conducting a fairness review. Infra Table 28b.
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Table 28a: Case Outcome by Whether the Court Conducted a Fairness
Review (a Substantive Review of the Dismissal to Determine Its Fairness)
(N=2054)
Fairness
Review?

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Yes
No

31.74%
68.26%

40.80%
2.92%

1 Chi-square=1044.008,

Both Sides
Win
Partially
41.10%
7.49%

Employer
Wins
18.10%
89.59%

DF=2, P<0.000.

Table 28b: Case Outcome by Whether the Court Conducted a Fairness
Review: Breakdown of Court Ruling When a Fairness Review was
Conducted (N=2054)

Yes. The
Internal
Regulations
Were
Unreasonable
Yes. The
Breach Was
Not Serious
Yes. Both the
Internal
Regulations
Were
Unreasonable
and the Breach
Was Not
Serious
Yes. Other
Grounds for
Finding the
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Frequency

Employee
Wins
66.67%

Both Sides
Win
Partially
30.56%

1.75%

Employer
Wins
2.78%

5.99%

54.47%

44.72%

0.81%

0.24%

80%

0%

20%

18.35%

45.36%

53.05%

1.59%
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Dismissal
Unfair or
Illegal
Yes. The
Dismissal Was
Fair
No. Did Not
Conduct a
Substantive
Review

5.40%

0%

1.80%

98.20%

68.26%

2.92%

7.49%

89.59%

1 Chi-square=1469.876,

i.

DF = 10, P < 0.001.

Procedural Variables
i.

Trial in Absentia

From the data (n=2054) in Table 29, when the employer is absent
at trial, the employee loses the least (28.57%), which is
understandable. It is, however, paradoxical that the employee loses
more when both parties are present (67.18%) than when the
employee was absent (61.54%). When both parties were absent, the
employee loses 100% of the time. Trial in absentia was significant in
the variation of the outcome of the case (Chi-square=17.346, DF = 6,
P < 0.01)
Table 29: Case Outcome by Trial in Absentia (N=2054)
Trial in
Absentia

Frequency

Employee
Wins

Yes. The
Employee
Was Absent
Yes. The
Employer
Was Absent

0.63%

0.68%
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38.46%

Both Sides
Win
Partially
0%

Employer
Wins
61.54%

35.71%

35.71%

28.57%
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Both Parties 98.64%
Were
Present
Both Parties 0.05%
Were
Absent
1 Chi-square=17.346,

ii.

14.66%

18.16%

67.18%

0%

0%

100%

DF = 6, P < 0.01.

Legal Basis of Court’s Decision:
Substantive/Procedural/Both

Based on the data (n=2054) in Table 30, it appears that whenever
the court rules on a purely procedural basis, the employee has a
greater chance of winning (employee wins 28.26%). The employee’s
wining rate is around the same when the court rules on a purely
substantive basis as when the court rules on both procedural and
substantive bases. It is difficult to make sense of this finding. One
possible reason is that since the rate of frequency of the court ruling
on a purely procedural basis is very low (2.24%), these cases are
likely to involve more serious procedural breaches on the part of the
employer, thus explaining the higher winning rate of the employee.
The legal basis of the court’s ruling was significant in the variation
of the outcome of the case (Chi-square=16.660, DF = 4, P < 0.01).
Table 30: Case Outcome by the Legal Basis of Court’s Ruling
(N=2054)
Legal Basis
of Court’s
Ruling
Substantive
Basis
Procedural
Basis
Both

Frequency Employee Both Sides
Wins
Win Partially

Employer
Wins

42.26%

14.29%

18.20%

67.51%

2.24%

28.26%

32.61%

39.13%

55.50%

14.91%

17.54%

67.54%

1 Chi-square=16.660,
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Law and Regulations of the State
i.

Relevant Labor Statutory Provisions Applied by the
Court

Based on the data (n=2054) in Table 31, when courts apply prolabor local rules,166 the employee wins more than when the rules are
not applied. This shows that local legislation that seeks to protect
labor rights are helpful to employees in advancing their cases in
litigation. When the court applies Article 47 (relating to the
calculation of compensation), Article 48 (relating to the consequence
of unlawful termination) or Article 87 (relating to double financial
compensation for unlawful termination) of the LCL, 167 the
employees’ winning rate is higher than when these provisions were
not applied. The application of relevant labor statutory provisions
was significant in the variation of the outcome of the case.168

166
Pro-labor local rules applied by courts include, for example, Chongqingshi
Shiye Baoxian Tiaoli ( 重 庆 市 失 业 保 险 条 例 ) [Regulations on Unemployment
Insurance of Chongqing] arts. 18, 24, 25 (promulgated by the Standing Comm.
People’s Cong. Chongqing Municipality, Nov. 29, 2011, effective Jan. 1, 2012),
https://www.pkulaw.com/lar/a62e26236f904f5417251a6213fcb728bdfb.html
[https://perma.cc/C8JD-GTUT] (China); Guanyu Qiye Xiaji Gaowen Jintie
Biaozhun de Tongzhi (关于企业夏季高温津贴标准的通知) [Notice of Enterprise
Summer Heat Allowance Rates] (promulgated by the Jiangsu Provincial Dep’t
Hum. Res. & Soc. Sec., Provincial Nat’l Tax’n Bureau & Provincial Loc. Tax’n
Bureau,
Jun.
27,
2011,
effective
Jun.
27,
2011),
https://www.pkulaw.com/lar/88d45c6c8d5c7993c0353195456808febdfb.html
[https://perma.cc/UG87-UXMZ] (China); Fujiansheng Shishi Gongshang Baoxian
Tiaoli Banfa (福建省实施《工伤保险条例》办法) [Measures for the Implementation
of the Regulations on Work Injury Insurance in Fujian Province], art. 27
(promulgated by People’s Gov. Fujian Province, Sep. 4, 2011, effective Sep. 4, 2011),
https://www.pkulaw.com/lar/4b5bd067e3c00d327a6eccebf067f2b7bdfb.html
[https://perma.cc/M3UG-ANC8] (China).
167
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 47-48, 87.
168
See infra Table 31.
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Table 31: Case Outcome by Relevant Labor Statutory Provision
Applied by the Court (N=2054)
Relevant Labor
Statutory
Provision
Applied?
Art. 39 of Yes
the Labor No
Contract
Law1
Art. 47 of Yes
the Labor No
Contract
Law2
Art. 48 of Yes
the Labor No
Contract
Law3
Art. 87 of Yes
the Labor No
Contract
Law4
ProYes
Labor
No
Local
Rules5

Frequency Employee Both Sides Employer
Wins
Win
Wins
Partially
85.00%
15.00%

11.34%
35.39%

13.86%
42.53%

74.80%
22.08%

22.54%
77.46%

37.37%
8.42%

56.37%
7.04%

6.26%
84.54%

15.00%
85.00%

39.61%
10.60%

43.51%
13.69%

16.88%
75.72%

24.25%
75.75%

34.34%
8.74%

46.99%
8.93%

18.67%
82.33%

9.40%
90.60%

19.17%
14.51%

25.91%
17.36%

54.92%
68.14%

Chi-square=328.627, DF = 2, P < 0.001
Chi-square=1001.090, DF = 2, P < 0.001
3 Chi-square=411.125, DF = 2, P < 0.001
4 Chi-square=694.721, DF = 2, P < 0.001
5 Chi-square=14.147, DF = 2, P <0.001
1
2
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k. Linear Regression
i.

A Methodological Note

The multivariate linear regression of this study only selected a
portion of the variables as independent variables and dependent
variables.169 This is because multivariate regression requires both
independent and dependent variables to be continuous variables.
As such, categorical variables (such as the location of the parties, the
employee’s claim type, type of legal representation of the parties, the
employer’s capacity, and the principal reason for dismissal) are not
selected for the regression.
ii.

Relationships Between Relevant Independent Variables
and Monetary Award

According to the linear regression results in Table 32 (under
Model 1), a number of independent variables (i.e., the average
earned income of the employee, the amount of the monetary claim,
the amount of monetary award in the previous labor dispute
arbitration and whether double financial compensation is claimed)
are significantly positively related to the monetary award in the
litigation. Regional differences (in terms of per capita GDP in each
province) also has a positive impact on the monetary award.
Under Model 2 also in Table 32, “fairness review” is added to
the linear regression. The regression shows that the court
conducting a fairness review is significantly positively related to the
monetary award.
Under the law, employees who are wrongfully dismissed are
automatically entitled to double financial compensation. 170
However, in practice, the courts will not consider awarding double
financial compensation unless specifically pleaded. 171 The linear
regression (under both models) shows that claiming double
financial compensation is significantly positively related to the
monetary award. One possible explanation for this significantly
169
170
171

See infra Tables 32-33.
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 87.
See supra Section V.F.3; supra Table 19.
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positive relationship is that employees will only claim double
financial compensation when their cases are strong.
The linear regression (under both models), which shows that
monetary award in the previous labor dispute arbitration is
positively and significantly related to the monetary award in the
litigation, suggests that previous arbitration outcome is indicative of
litigation outcome.
While no particular pattern is identified in the variation of
outcome by the average earned income of the employees in the
bivariate analysis above, 172 the average earned income of the
employee and the monetary award is significantly positively related
under Model 1 of the linear regression. The significance expanded
under Model 2. A possible explanation for this is that an employee
with higher income is more resourceful and in a more advantageous
position to litigate the case than an employee with lower income.
The amount of the monetary claim is significantly positively
related to the monetary award under both models of the linear
regression. It appears that a greater monetary claim is likely to result
in a larger monetary award.
Courts in different regions may adopt divergent adjudication
policies. Economic divergences (here focusing on GDP per capita)173
may affect the outcome of these cases. For instance, some regions
may be more pro-employer than others due to economic
development needs.174 Under Model 1, the linear regression shows
regional differences (in terms of per capita GDP in each province)
has a positive impact on the monetary award. However, Model 2
shows no significance between the two.
Whether the employer notified the labor union is significantly
negatively related to the monetary award under Model 1. In other
words, if the employer failed to notify the labor union before
dismissing the employee, the employee will receive more
compensation. The significance decreased under Model 2.
Interestingly, the linear regression (under both models) shows
that legal representation of both the employer and the employee are
insignificantly related to the monetary award.

See supra Section V.C.5; supra Table 10.
For an explanation about the data source, see supra note 139.
174
See supra Section V.A.2; supra Table 2. However, as Table 2 shows, some
regions with higher GDP are not necessarily more pro-employer than some regions
with lower GDP.
172

173
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Table 32: Relationships Between Relevant Independent Variables and
Monetary Award in Litigation (N=2054)

Regional Variations (Per Capita
GDP in Each Province)
Year of the Decision
Number of Employees as
Plaintiff/Defendant
Length of Absence (of the
Employee) Without
Justification
Average Earned Income of the
Employee
Employee’s Legal
Representation
Employer’s Legal
Representation
Amount of the Monetary Claim
Employer Notified Labor
Union
Previous Labor Dispute
Arbitration (Whether or Not)
Warning Notice Given by the
Employer
Previous Labor Dispute
Arbitration (Money Awarded)
Double Financial
Compensation
Employee Claimed Litigation
Costs
Court Conducted Fairness
Review (Whether or Not)
R2
*p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Model 1
.056*

Model 2
.039

.043
.010

.042
.003

-.021

.008

.077**

.081***

.012

.022

-.012

-.008

.162***
-.109***

.192***
-.056*

.032

.035

-.033

-.003

.451***

.383***

.126***

.094***

-.030

.002

.341***
.363

.467

2022]

Are Chinese Courts Pro-Labor or Pro-Employer
iii.

353

Relationships Between Relevant Independent
Variables and the Employee’s Success Rate

For the purpose of the linear regression, the employee’s “success
rate” is calculated as follows: (1) for purely monetary claims, the
success rate is the monetary award divided by the monetary claim;
(2) for purely non-monetary claims, the success rate is 100% when
the claim is allowed and 0% if the claim is disallowed; 175 (3) for
hybrid claims (with both monetary and non-monetary elements),
the success rate is the success rate of the monetary claim*0.5 + the
success rate of the non-monetary claim*0.5.
Under Model 1 of the linear regression in Table 33, the length of
absence (of the employee) without justification, the amount of the
monetary claim, whether employee claimed litigation costs, and
whether the employer has notified the labor union before the
dismissal are significantly negatively related to the employee’s
success rate in litigation. Warning notice has a negative correlation
with the employee’s success rate.176 In other words, if the employer
gave warning notice, there is a lesser chance of the employee
winning in litigation.
The monetary award in the previous labor dispute arbitration is
significantly positively related to the employee’s success rate in
litigation. In other words, the greater the amount of monetary
award in the previous arbitration, the easier it is for employees to
win in the litigation. This shows that the outcome of labor dispute
arbitration is a yardstick for litigation success. Whether the
employee claimed double financial compensation is also
significantly positively related to the employee’s success rate in
litigation. This can be explained as the employees will only claim
double financial compensation when their cases are strong.

175
For pure non-monetary claims, there are two situations: (a) request to
continue the labor contract; or (b) request to confirm that a labor relationship exists
between employer and employee during a certain period of time. For the first
situation, the employee’s wining rate is 100% if the court decides to continue the
labor contract; otherwise, the wining rate is 0%. For the second situation, the
employee’s winning rate is 100% if the court decides to confirm the labor
relationship; otherwise, the winning rate is 0%.
176
Warning notice refers to the employer giving written warning to the
employee for violation of the internal regulations of the company before the
dismissal.
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It is worth noting that there is a positive correlation between the
year and the employee’s success rate, which means that as time goes
by, it is easier for employees to win in litigation.
In Table 33, under Model 2, “fairness review” is added to the
linear regression. The regression shows that the court conducting a
fairness review is significantly positively related to the employee’s
success rate.
The length of absence (of the employee) without justification and
warning notice (which were significant under Model 1) become
insignificant under Model 2. The positive and negative correlations
and significance of other variables (under Model 1) have not
changed in Model 2, although the significance of whether the
employer notified the labor union has been weakened under Model
2.
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Table 33: Relationships Between Relevant Independent Variables and
the Employee’s Success Rate in Litigation (N=2054)

Regional Variations (Per Capita
GDP in Each Province)
Year of the Decision
Number of Employees as
Plaintiff/Defendant
Length of Absence (of the
Employee) Without Justification
Average Earned Income of the
Employee
Employee’s Legal
Representation
Employer’s Legal
Representation
Amount of the Monetary Claim
Employer Notified Labor Union
Previous Labor Dispute
Arbitration (Whether or Not)
Previous Labor Dispute
Arbitration (Monetary Award)
Double Financial Compensation
Employee Claimed Litigation
Costs
Warning Notice Given by the
Employer
Court Conducted Fairness
Review (Whether or Not)
R2
*p <.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001
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Model 1
-.009

Model 2
-.024

.106***
.019

.104***
.005

-.076*

-.019

-.004

.004

-.046

-.027

-.037

-.030

-.163***
-.165***
-.002

-.104***
-.062**
.008

.271***

.138***

.135***
-.134***

.073***
-.071***

-.081**

-.023
.668***

.179

.578
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VI. DISCUSSION
a. The Employers Came Out Ahead by a Substantial Margin—
Confirming Chinese Courts Are Pro-Employer
From the data (n=2054), the employers came out ahead by a
significant margin.177 The employers won 66.89% of the time.178 The
success rate of employees is very low, only 14.95%. This means that
employers are winning by a substantial margin of 51.94%. The
recovery rates for employees in monetary claims tell the same story
(n=1848): an overwhelming victory for employers. The employee
recovered nothing 68.51% of the time.179 The employee achieved full
recovery only 11.58% of the time.180
This study contradicts existing empirical studies that found
employees came out ahead. 181 It also contradicts the established
perception that Chinese courts are pro-labor. Informants have
confirmed that LCL is a pro-labor piece of legislation. 182 One
informant said, the LCL is definitely pro-labor, as “the employee is
the weaker party.”183 Most informants were of the view that courts
must interpret the LCL and other labor statutes in a way that favors
employees.184 A pertinent question arises: if the labor statutes are
clearly pro-labor, how can employers win by such a substantial
margin? Employers’ overwhelming success in this study suggests
that Chinese courts are not pro-labor, but pro-employer.

See supra Section V.B.1; supra Table 4.
From the employees’ points of view, their losing rate is 66.89% of the time.
Supra Table 4.
179
Supra Table 4.
180
In rare cases (0.32%), the court awarded more than 100% of the monetary
claim (the highest recovery rate was 133% of the monetary claim). Supra Table 4.
181 For empirical studies finding that employees came out ahead, see sources
cited supra note 76 and accompanying text. For an example of studies finding the
opposite, see He & Su, supra note 74.
182
Informant ID: 2020.07.09.1, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.07.20.9, supra
note 17; Informant ID: 2020.08.11, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.06.17.9, supra
note 17; Informant ID: 2020.07.09.2, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.06.17.6, supra
note 17.
183
Informant ID: 2020.07.20.9, supra note 17.
184
The questionnaire responses are on file with the author.
177
178
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b. Critical Evidence Confirming That Courts Are Pro-Employer:
Courts Did Not Conduct Fairness Review in Most Cases
The data clearly show that courts do not favor employees (but
favor employers), as courts in most cases (68.26% of the time) did
not conduct a “fairness review” (a substantive review of the
dismissal to determine its fairness).185 This implies that courts in
these cases simply looked at the facts to determine if the employees
seriously breached the employer company’s internal regulations.
The courts in these cases did not consider whether the dismissals
were fair or unfair. No pro-labor court would leave out a fairness
review. In fact, a “neutral” court would still conduct a fairness
review, as it is an obligation of the court under Article 20 of the SPC
2008 Interpretation. 186 Only a pro-employer court would neglect
such a legal obligation. Evidence from the interviews confirm that
judges generally ignore such a legal obligation citing different
reasons. 187 Informants confirm that some judges do not see the
fairness review as a “mandatory requirement.”188 Even judges who
believe there is an inherent “moral duty” to conduct the review189
argue that the LCL is unclear as to whether there is an expressed
obligation to conduct a fairness review. One informant pointed out
that many judges see Article 39(2) of the LCL as a “contentious
provision” that gives “extensive discretion to the judge”, including
the discretion not to conduct a fairness review.190

See supra Table 28a.
Under the SPC 2008 Interpretation, if the employer is “really wrong” in
dismissing the employee, the court can revoke the dismissal. This confers the
power, as well as the responsibility, on the court to assess whether or not the
dismissal was unfair. The court’s failure to conduct a fairness review is, therefore,
a contravention of the law. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
187
As stated above, if the employer is “really wrong” (or clearly in error) (确
有错误) in dismissing the employee, the court can revoke the dismissal. Article 20
of the SPC 2008 Interpretation confers not only the power to review fairness of a
dismissal, but also an obligation to conduct a review. Supra note 108. The
provision, on its face, is permissive in that the court can revoke the dismissal if there
is a clear error. But, by implication, the court must have done a fairness review
before it is in a position to revoke the dismissal. The fairness review is not an
option, it is an obligation.
188
See, e.g., Informant ID: 2020.07.20.9, supra note 17; Informant ID:
2020.06.17.9, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.07.09.1, supra note 17.
189
See, e.g., Informant ID: 2020.07.09.3, supra note 17; Informant ID:
2020.06.17.2, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.06.17.9, supra note 17.
190
Informant ID: 2020.07.20.9, supra note 17.
185
186
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Even barring the legal requirement, any decision without a
fairness review is bound to be irrational (and unjust) as the employer
gets a free ride whenever it proves any breach of its internal
regulations by the employee, however technical. Only a proemployer court would deliberately ignore reviewing the fairness of
the dismissal and accept such irrationality in its decision. In fact,
conducting a fairness review is the logical step in adjudicating
Serious Breach Dismissal Cases. When a fairness review is
conducted (frequency rate of 31.73%), the court almost always find
for the employee when the dismissal was unfair 191 and almost
always find for the employer when the dismissal was fair.192 Failing
to conduct a fairness review leaves employees completely
unprotected from unfair dismissal. For instance, the internal
regulations could be so unreasonable that breaching the regulations
should not justify dismissal. Justice cannot be served if breaching
the internal regulations was the only factor that the court considered
in reaching its decision.
Some informants have confirmed that courts are unwilling to
conduct a fairness review because they are minded to “preserve
corporate autonomy” and “avoid interfering with the internal
management of the company.” 193 One informant said “corporate
autonomy” is important, and “courts try not to substitute their
views for the views of the employers.”194 In other words, so long as
the internal regulations are legally constituted, 195 courts are
unwilling to challenge them on the basis of “reasonableness” or
“fairness” as courts believe the employer is acting within the sphere
191
When the court found the internal regulations were unreasonable (after
conducting a fairness review), the losing rate of the employee was 2.78%; when the
breach was not serious, the losing rate of the employee was as low as 0.81%; and
when the court found the dismissal was unfair or illegal on other grounds, the
losing rate of the employee was 1.59%. Supra Table 28b.
192
The losing rate of the employee was as high as 98.20% when the court
found that the dismissal was fair after conducting a fairness review. Supra Table
28b.
193
Informant ID: 2020.07.09.1, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.07.20.9, supra
note 17; Informant ID: 2020.06.17.6, supra note 17.
194
Informant ID: 2020.07.09.1, supra note 17.
195
Courts are, however, concerned about the “legality” of the internal
regulations. Internal regulations could be ruled as “illegal” for a number of reasons.
The most common ground is that the internal regulations were adopted without
proper endorsement by the decision-making body of the employer’s company
(either the board or the general meeting). The other reason is the failure to publicly
notify (gongshi) the employee about the contents of the internal regulations
(otherwise known as the public notification requirement).
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of its corporate autonomy to dismiss employees based on its own
regulations. 196 The court’s overarching concern for “corporate
autonomy” is another clear indication that courts in China are proemployer. “Corporate autonomy” has become a convenient excuse
for courts to evade the critical question of whether the dismissal was
unfair. If courts are pro-labor, they should not be concerned at all
about the nebulous notion of “corporate autonomy” (or “internal
management autonomy”) and should step in to protect labor rights.
The unwillingness of most Chinese courts to conduct a fairness
review points to one conclusion: Chinese courts are pro-employer.
The fairness review is pivotal in the determination of outcome. The
linear regression shows that conducting a fairness review has
significant positive relations with monetary award and the
employee’s success rates.197 The stark difference in the employer’s
success rate with or without fairness review supports this
conclusion. When no fairness review is conducted, the employer
wins 89.59% of the time. When the court does conduct a fairness
review, the employer prevails only 18.10% of the time.198 When the
court conducts a fairness review, the odds are reversed and the
employee actually comes out ahead.199 By leaving out the fairness
review, Chinese courts are deliberately taking the employer’s side.
There are two other pieces of evidence that confirm the proemployer stance of courts. First, according to the SPC 2013
Interpretation, if the employer fails to notify the labor union before
dismissal, the court should automatically rule in favor of the
employee. However, according to the data, the court has ruled
against the employee 59.72% of the time in such a situation.200 This
is a direct contradiction of the SPC 2013 Interpretation and reveals
the court’s favor toward employers. Second, employees who are
wrongfully dismissed are automatically entitled to double financial
compensation under the law.201 However, in practice, the courts will
not consider awarding double financial compensation unless
specifically pleaded, which is a violation of the law and reveals
196
Informant ID: 2020.07.09.1, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.07.20.9, supra
note 17; Informant ID: 2020.06.17.6, supra note 17.
197
See supra Tables 32-33.
198
Supra Table 28a.
199
See supra Table 28a. When a fairness review is conducted, the employee
wins 40.80% of the time. When a fairness review is not conducted, the employee
only wins 2.92% of the time. Supra Table 28a.
200
Supra Table 21.
201
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 87.
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judicial bias that favors employers. From the data, 69.08% of
employees did not specifically plead double financial
compensation.202 This practice (which is against the law) is another
clear indication that Chinese courts are pro-employer, as even a
“neutral court” would award double financial compensation
without the need for it to be specifically pleaded.
c. Practical Reasons the Court Did Not Conduct a Fairness Review
Informants have identified practical reasons why courts, in
many cases, did not review the fairness of the dismissal. 203 One
informant, explaining why he exercised his discretion to not conduct
a fairness review, said that internal regulations are “very well
thought out documents” and are drafted based on detailed and good
precedents. 204 It is not entirely possible for judges to find problems
in them, even if a fairness review is conducted. To some judges,
conducting fairness review is a daunting task, and a timeconsuming one. Informants said the overloaded dockets of courts
was the other reason for judges’ reluctance to conduct the review.205
One informant said that judges are simply “too busy” to conduct the
review.206 Another informant mentioned that judges are concerned
that if they conducted fairness reviews and rigorously enforced
labor rights, it would open a floodgate of cases, which would not be
in the institutional interests of the courts. This informant said courts
from less developed regions tend to hold this view.207

Supra Table 19.
When asked why courts in most cases did not conduct a fairness review,
some respondents to the questionnaire said that the courts did not have sufficient
time to conduct the review due to heavy caseloads, while others attributed it to the
judicial belief that the formulation of the internal regulations and the decisions to
dismiss are the internal business decisions of the employer.
204
Informant ID: 2020.07.09.01, supra note 17.
205
Informant ID: 2020.07.09.01, supra note 17; Informant ID: 2020.07.09.02,
supra note 17.
206
Informant ID: 2020.07.09.01, supra note 17.
207
Informant ID: 2020.06.17.6, supra note 17.
202
203
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d. Contribution to the Party Capability Theory
At first glance, the finding in this study seems to confirm
Galanter’s party capability theory, as employers (the “haves”) came
out ahead. But when one looks closer, the employer really won
because courts favored employers, not because of party capability
advantages. As mentioned above, the courts sided with the
employers by refusing to conduct a fairness review in most cases.
When the court actually conducts a fairness review, the outcome is
reversed and the employee actually comes out ahead.208 The party
capability theory presupposes courts are generally impartial and
places a high premium on procedural fairness.209 While this may be
true for US courts, it may not be applicable to judiciaries of other
countries, especially in developing states where courts tend to be
partial and dependent. Haynie argues that while the party
capability theory applies in industrialized nations, its applicability
in developing states is questionable (using the Philippines as an
example).210 In He and Su’s Study, despite finding the haves came
out ahead in Shanghai courts, the author admitted that “there is a
need to go beyond the party capability theory” and cited a number
of factors that determined outcome aside of party resource
imbalance. 211 These factors included, among other things, the
political and social “penetrability” of Chinese courts (i.e. the fact that
Chinese courts are subject to outside political influence and stability
maintenance concerns). 212 Local governments, with potentially
vested interests in the haves, are likely to influence courts to side
with the haves. The margin of victory for the haves in Shanghai
courts is most extreme when it is a government agency and
government-related firm litigating (whether against repeat players

208 See supra Table 28a (showing that when a fairness review is conducted, the
employee wins 40.8% of the time and that when a fairness review is not conducted,
the employee only wins 2.92% of the time).
209
See Galanter, supra note 95, at 96 (outlining general assumptions including
that court-like agencies purport to adjudicate conflicts impartially).
210
Haynie, supra note 69, at 60.
211
He & Su, supra note 74, at 139 ("[T]he party capability thesis remains intact,
if not sufficient, to explain away the winning gap between the haves and the havenots.”).
212
See supra note 74, at 139-42 (discussing the concept of “penetrable courts”).
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or one-shotters). 213 This shows the significance of political
embeddedness in determining outcome.
In the current study, legal representation, a critical element of
party capability, is insignificant in the determination of outcome.214
If one takes away the judicial favor for employers (i.e., the court
faithfully conducts a fairness review in every case), the employees
(have-nots) would have prevailed. This finding casts doubt as to
whether party capability theory can adequately explain the
litigation dynamics in China. This finding echoes an earlier study
by the author on litigation between married-out women (“MOW”)
(have-nots) and village collectives (haves) in Chinese grassroots
courts, in which it was found that the have-nots came out ahead by
a substantial margin.215 In that study, the data “shows the courts
favored the ‘have-nots’ over the ‘haves’” and that the “judicial favor
for MOW . . . propelled the MOW (the ‘have-nots’) to victory.” 216
That study and the current study show the instrumental importance
of judicial preference in the determination of outcome in China. If
the court favors a particular party, it is much more likely that that
party will prevail. Judicial preference for a party appears to take
precedence over resource advantages/disadvantages.
e. Lawyer Capability
Legal representation is a crucial variable of party capability.217
This study shows mixed findings when it comes to lawyer
capability. In the bivariate analysis, the employee loses more when
the employee is represented.218 In the same analysis, the employer
wins more when the employer is represented. The outcome varied
insignificantly by legal representation of the employee (Chisquare=5.638, DF = 2, P = 0.060) 219 and significantly by legal
representation of the employer (Chi-square=6.660, DF = 2, P <
213
Supra note 74, at 139 (“[A]fter controlling for legal representation, the
difference in winning rates across the classes of the parties remained significant and
large.”).
214 Supra Section V.K.2; supra Tables 32-33.
215
Supra note 68, at 160.
216
Supra note 68, 68-69.
217
See Galanter, supra note 95, at 114-19 (discussing the beneficial implications
of legal representation for a party's outcome).
218
See supra Table 14.
219
See supra Table 15.
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0.05). 220 The linear regression, however, shows no significant
relationship between legal representation of either party with the
monetary award in litigation.221 The linear regression also shows no
significant relationship between legal representation of either party
with the employee’s success rate in litigation.222
f. Other Observations
An interesting observation can be drawn from the data (n=2054)
relating to the employer’s capacity.223 It seems that courts are most
favorable towards government employees, and least favorable to
employees of foreign firms, as employees have lost the least when
pitting against state organs and institutions (58.54%), and have lost
the most when they are litigating against foreign firms (79.08%) and
their local subsidiaries (79.21%).224 This may reflect an underlying
judicial policy of a sliding scale of labor rights protection. If one
imagines two extremities on the scale of the labor market, one being
state-controlled labor market and the other being free-market labor
market, government employees belong to the former and foreign
firm employees belong to the latter. It would be logical to expect
courts to afford greater protection to employees in the statecontrolled labor market (China being a socialist state) and less
protection to employees in the free-market labor market.
The most common principal reason for dismissal was absence
without justification (frequency rate of 40.51%).225 The losing rate of
the employee when the principal reason for dismissal was absence
without justification was 72.72%, which is higher than the overall
losing rate of 66.89%. 226 An informant said dismissal based on
absence without justification is frequently used by employers as a
convenient excuse to dismiss employees.227 Sometimes employers
will set unreasonable rules on absence. For instance, a two-day
absence is regarded as a serious breach of internal regulations. But
220
221
222
223
224
225
226
227

See supra Table 15.
See supra Table 32.
See supra Table 33.
See supra Table 12.
Supra Table 12.
See supra Table 17.
See supra Tables 4, 17.
Informant ID: 2020.07.20.9, supra note 17.
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there could be many reasons for an employee’s unannounced
absence. For example, the employee may be sick and can only
produce evidence of sickness after the period of absence. The
employer may say that the evidence was not furnished at the
beginning of the period of absence. Absence regulations are prone
to be manipulated to disfavor the employee. The relatively high
losing rate suggests that courts are likely to have simply rubberstamped the decision of the employer as long as the employee was
dismissed according to the employer’s absence regulations, no
matter how unreasonable they were.
The court takes a very technical approach in the determination
of legality of the dismissal. The court will usually rule the dismissal
to be “illegal” if there is some procedural irregularity in the adoption
of the internal regulations, for example, if the internal regulations
were adopted without proper endorsement by the decision-making
body of the employer company (either the board or general
meeting), or if the employer failed to publicly notify (gongshi) the
employee about the contents of the internal regulations (or the
public notification requirement). Yet this approach to legality is
overly technical and simplistic. The court should be in a position to
test the “reasonableness” and “fairness” of the dismissal. If the
internal regulations are unreasonable, the dismissal should still be
ruled “illegal” even though technical boxes are ticked.
Serving a warning notice on the employee before proceeding
with the dismissal is part of due process (although not strictly
required by the law). But having received a warning notice should
not negatively affect the employee’s case. The data tells a different
story. 228 The employee loses more when served with a warning
notice prior to dismissal (losing rate of 78.80%) when compared with
the employee who received no warning notice (losing rate of
63.88%). One way to interpret this data is courts are stricter on
employers if they fail to serve a warning notice. But it can equally
be interpreted that courts presume that somehow an employee who
received a warning notice needs less protection from the court. The
same can be said about whether the employee was given an
opportunity to be heard. Where the employee was given an
opportunity to be heard, the employee loses more in court (losing
rate of 82.35%) as compared to the employee who was not given a
chance to be heard (losing rate of 66.50%).229 One speculation is that
228
229

See supra Table 23.
See supra Table 22.
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the courts view that if the employer had heard the employee’s side
of the story, the dismissal was somehow more “just.” But this kind
of assumption is irrational. The fact that the employee was granted
an opportunity to be heard by the employer does not imply the
employee’s case is weaker.
When courts apply pro-labor local rules, the employee wins
more.230 This phenomenon makes good sense when one looks at the
pro-labor regulations in Suzhou. Under the Suzhou Regulations, if
the employer fails to give the employee an opportunity to be heard
before dismissal, the dismissal must be considered unfair (and
therefore, unlawful). 231 The Suzhou Regulations also imposes a
requirement on the employer to consult (not just to notify) the labor
union if an employee is dismissed under Article 39(2) of the LCL.232
These procedural safeguards are absent under national law. Going
forward, central policymakers are recommended to consider local
pro-labor regulations (like the Suzhou Regulations) in revising
national labor statutes.
g. Limitations of This Study
This study has a number of limitations. First, it focuses only on
Serious Breach Dismissal Cases and does not examine other labor
dispute lawsuits. While Serious Breach Dismissal Cases are an
important type of labor dispute lawsuit, it cannot be representative
of all labor dispute lawsuits. The conclusion that Chinese courts are
pro-employer must be qualified as such.233 Second, this study does
not capture cases that were withdrawn or settled. It is possible that
more meritorious cases brought by employees were settled (or
withdrawn as a result of settlement or other reasons) at an early
stage of litigation. If these cases were to enter the hearing stage, the
success rate of employees may increase. There is no practical way
to capture the judicial attitude towards settled and withdrawn cases
empirically short of interviewing all judges who handled those
cases. This limitation would be present in any study of this nature.
Third, this study does not look into the attitude of the tribunals in
See supra Table 31.
WORK INJURY LEGAL COMPENSATION NETWORK, supra note 49.
232
WORK INJURY LEGAL COMPENSATION NETWORK, supra note 49.
233
This is contrasted with the He and Su Study in which labor disputes are
examined generally. See supra note 92.
230
231
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labor dispute arbitration. Labor dispute arbitration is the first
instance dispute resolution forum for labor disputes in China. While
this study finds Chinese courts to be pro-employer, labor dispute
arbitration tribunals may not necessarily be pro-employer. 234
Fourth, this study only covers DADs from 2010 to 2018. It does not
cover the position pre-2010. Informants have indicated that courts
tend to be more in favor of employees in the early days right after
the passage of the LCL (in 2008).235 This attitude may have changed
throughout the years. Fifth, this study only surveyed first instance
court decisions. The success rate of employees may change when
some of these decisions go on appeal. Finally, the study sampled
DADs that are available online. It is expected that courts will not
disclose all DADs, as some of them may be politically sensitive. The
sample, therefore, cannot be completely representative using only
publicly available sources.236 However, given that Serious Breach
Dismissal Cases are unlikely to involve highly sensitive matters, it is
expected that the proportion of undisclosed DADs is very small.
VII. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This study contradicts the established perception that Chinese
courts are pro-labor and past empirical literature that suggests
employees are winning in labor disputes lawsuits. 237 Empirical
evidence in this study shows the employers came out ahead by a
significant margin.238 This suggests Chinese courts are, in fact, proemployer. The data clearly shows courts do not favor the
employees, as courts in most cases (68.26% of the time) did not
conduct a substantive review of the dismissal to determine its
fairness (i.e. a “fairness review”),239 which is required under the SPC

234
As discussed above, the literature suggests that labor dispute arbitration
tribunals are generally pro-labor. See cases cited supra note 77.
235
Informant ID: 2020.07.09.3, supra note 17.
236
See He & Su, supra note 74, at 128 (recognizing case analysis cannot always
be representative of cases from a given court because not all cases are public).
237
If courts are truly pro-labor, employees should have overwhelming success
in litigation. The data shows the opposite scenario. See supra Table 2.
238
See supra Table 4.
239
See supra Table 28a.
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2008 Interpretation. 240 A pro-labor court (or even a “neutral” court)
would most certainly conduct a fairness review. Only a proemployer court would leave out a fairness review and rubber stamp
the employer’s decision. Apart from this main finding, a number of
implications can be drawn from this study. First, while the LCL is
pro-labor,241 the judicial interpretation of the LCL did not secure a
pro-labor outcome. As illustrated in this study, courts had
frustrated their function to protect employees from unfair dismissal
when they failed to conduct a fairness review in most cases. This
demonstrates that while statutory law may favor the weaker
group/party, courts may not interpret the law in such a way that
result in the protection of the weaker group/party. Second, despite
the socialist rhetoric underlying the statutory and policy
infrastructure that governs labor-employer relations, actual judicial
practice suggests that courts are in no way “socialist.” If anything,
courts are very “business minded” and would not hesitate in siding
with employers. Third, it appears that the LCL (at least Article 39(2)
of the LCL)242 needs urgent revision. Currently, the language in LCL
is unclear on whether a fairness review is required. Many judges
use this as an excuse to skip the fairness review, while turning a
blind eye to their obligation under SPC 2008 Interpretation.243 This
is highly detrimental to the protection of employees’ rights. To
avoid misconception, Article 39(2) of the LCL should be amended to
expressly set out the requirement to conduct a fairness review.
Fourth, the case outcome varied significantly by regional variation
(by province) (Chi-square=132.917, DF=58, P<0.001). 244 From the
data, one possibility for the variation is that courts in different
localities applied divergent local rules and regulations (some rules
being more favorable to labor than others).245 This finding provides
a basis for future studies to investigate the causal link between local
pro-labor rules and employee litigants’ success rates across

240
Under the SPC 2008 Interpretation, if the employer is “really wrong” in
dismissing the employee, the court can revoke the dismissal. This confers
substantive review powers (as well as an obligation) on the court to assess whether
or not the dismissal was unfair. The court’s failure to conduct a substantive review
is, therefore, a contravention of the law. See supra note 108.
241
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
242
Laodong Hetong Fa (劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law], art. 39(2).
243
See supra note 108.
244
See supra Table 2.
245
See supra Table 31.
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geographic regions.246 It also forms the basis for future research on
which regional courts are relatively pro-labor and which are
relatively pro-employer.247 Fifth, this study shows that it is possible,
through examining court opinions, to decipher judicial attitudes in
the adjudication of cases. In this study, through empirically
analyzing the DADs of Serious Breach Dismissal Cases, it is revealed
that courts in China are pro-employer. Finally, this study casted
doubt as to whether party capability theory can adequately explain
the litigation dynamics in China. The linear regressions show legal
representation, a critical element of party capability, is insignificant
in the determination of outcome.248 If one takes away the judicial
favor for employers (i.e., the court faithfully conducts a fairness
review in every case), the employees (have-nots) would have come
out ahead. This finding echoes an earlier study on litigation
between married-out women (“MOW”) (have-nots) and village
collectives (haves) in Chinese grassroots courts, in which it was
found that the have-nots came out ahead by a substantial margin.249
In that study, the data “shows the courts favored the ‘have-nots’
over the ‘haves.’ It is believed that the judicial favor for MOW . . .
propelled the MOW (the ‘have-nots’) to victory.” 250 These two
studies show the instrumental importance of judicial preference for
a party in the determination of outcome. Judicial preference for a
party appears to take precedence over party capability (or resource
advantages/disadvantages) in shaping outcome.
Hopefully, future research on Chinese labor law and China’s
judicial system can build on and benefit from this study.

246
See supra Table 31 (showing that when courts apply pro-labor local rules,
the employee wins more, which shows that local legislation that seeks to protect
labor rights are helpful to employees in advancing their cases in litigation).
247
Informant ID: 2020.07.09.3, supra note 17 (featuring statements by one
informant that Nanjing courts are generally lenient towards employees, while
Shenzhen courts are vigorously pro-employer).
248
See supra Tables 32-33.
249
See supra note 68, at 1.
250
Supra note 68, at 68-69.
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(2000)

Han
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Judicial 2018
Assistant

Yes Inter Nanjing
media
te
Yes Inter Guangdong Judge
media
te
Yes Inter Guangdong Judge
media
te
Yes Inter Guangdong Judge
media
te
Yes Basic Guangdong Judge

Civil
Cases
Civil
Cases
Civil
Cases

2022]
2020.07 Female 29
.20.3
2020.07 Female
.20.4
2020.07 Male
55
.20.5
2020.07 Female 35
.20.6

Han

Bachelor No Basic Chongqing Judicial
(2015)
Assistant
Bachelor Yes Basic Chongqing Judicial
Assistant
Bachelor Yes Basic Chongqing Judge

Han

Bachelor Yes Basic Chongqing Judge

37

Han

29

Han

34

Han

37

Han

Bachelor Yes Basic Chongqing Judicial
Assistant
Master Yes Basic Chongqing Judicial
(2015)
Assistant
Bachelor Yes Basic Chongqing Judge
(2008)
Bachelor Yes Basic Chongqing Judge
(2006)

2020.08 Female 52
.11

Han

2020.07 Male
.20.7
2020.07 Female
.20.8
2020.07 Male
.20.9
2020.07 Male
.20.10

Han
Han

371
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Bachelor Yes Inter Nanjing
(2007)
media
te
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Civil
Cases
Not
Civil
provided Cases
Not
Civil
provided Cases
Civil
Not
provided Cases

Not
provided
Not
provided
Not
provided
Not
provided

Yes

2010

100,000

Yes

50,000

Yes

260,000

Yes

2015
2008
2006

Member 2004
of the
Adjudica
tion
Committ
ee

Civil
Cases
Civil
Cases
Civil
Cases
Civil
Cases

Civil
Cases

No
Yes
Yes

2020.
09.12

Not
Yes
provided

300,000

Yes

2020.
09.10

